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GENI;SRA L SUMMA R ~,"
The signature of the Maastricht Treaty, which was intended 1.o usher in
currency stabilito, by transfornling the European Monetaey System (EMS)
into an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a single currency, was
instead followed within months by the worst currency crisis for two
decades, h’eland was hit by the crisis as badly as any region in the
Community and the whole experience had already brought the issue of
cttrrency policy to cenu’e stage when, at the end of July 1993, the EMS
cluite suddenly collapsed under pressure of a new wave of speculation
directed mainly against the French fi-ano This paper reviews Ireland’s
experience in the EMS and asks whether any changes in currency policy
are suggested by recent events. Increasing complacency about the stability
of the system over the past five years led to realignment policy within the
system becoming too rigid. Its last months highlighted the weaknesses of
such a system fi’om h’eland’s point of view, including its vulnerabiliW to
speculation and the volatility which it entails for the h’ish pound-sterling
exchange rate.
Taking a longer perspective, the EMS has not been quite as bad a
system for Ireland as is sometimes made out. In particular, adherence to
the system cannot be blamed for h’ish labour pricing itself out of die
market. Nevertheless, it is equally wrong to give system all the credit for
having reduced inflation and it did not effectively provide insulation fi’om
the sharp worsening ofjoblessness in the UK during the 1980s.
Furthermore, it does appear that the system had the unclesirable side-effect
that real interest rates here were permanently higher than those in
Germany, and that it left us prone to surges in interest rates which
probably stifled potentially dynamic small businesses.
If EMU is still on the cards it will, I argue, represent an improvement
even if the UK stays out. In addition to the elimination of currency
tl’ansactions costs there will be no i’eCUl’l’el’iCe of the tlpWal’(’[ pl’eSStll’(2 on
in terest rates.
But recent events, and the aH)arently receding prospect of EMU, have
opened the question of exchange t,’ate regime choice in a new way. I review
the main options here and conclude that, while a combination of political
as well as economic arguments inhibited our making an unilateral move
~way from the narrow-hand EMS, the new ffceclorns allow definition of a
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policy which could represent an impr0venlent.
Exchange i,’ate regimes should not be changed very often. Stability of
tile exchange rate regime represents all element of tile financial
infrastructure allowing for long-term planning and a coherent basis for the
design of contracts. The recent change has been forced upon us, and bow
the h’ish pound is to be managed (if at all) under the new regime remains
to be clearly defined. There is much value in announcing and adhering to
an explicit and coherent strategy that will rarely require revision.
Uncertainty about the regime certainly weakens inflationary discipline
without providing ally compensating benefits for employment growth.
Since there does not appear to be the immediate prospect of new co-
operative exchange rate arrangements in the EC, die Government should
now cons|clef explicitly adopting a flexible target zone for a welghted
average of tile exchange rates of the currency vis-A-vis major trading
parmers, within the context of tile wider EMS braids that are now in effect.
X
While the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of tile European
Monetary System (EMS) remains formally in effect, the widening of the
permissible margins of fluctuation decided under pressure ill August 1993
amounts in practice to effective suspension of the regime which has
governed h’ish currency policy since 1979. Hanlpered by a lack of certainty
about the future direction of the EMS, the C.overnment nevertheless has to
map out a coherent exchange rate policy in the new situation. The
l)urpose of this paper is to review recent h’ish currency experience and to
consider the options now available.
Organisation of the paper
The paper is organised as follows, tU’ter dais introduction, we begin in
Chapter I with an overview of the role of currency policy in national
economic policy: what it can and cannot be expected to achieve. In
particular we discuss the partly competing funetiozls of exchange rate as a
"nominal anchor" and as a means of insulating economic activity from
external disturbances. Problems posed by divergent movements of the
values of partner currencies, and the difficulties of defending a currency
peg against speculation are given special attention. The section concludes
with a brief description of the main t)’pes of exchange rate regime in
operation around the world toda}~ Boxes highlight the experience of dlree
small European countries: Austria, Finland and Iceland.
Chapter 2 turns to a consideration of h’eland’s experience in the EMS,
identif),ing the degree to which this system either provided a nominal
anchor or insulated us fi’om external disturbances. Three weaknesses for
h’eland of the EMS are identified, namely the risk of competitiveness losses
against the UK, surges of speculative pressure when sterling is weak and an
apparent tendency on a long-term basis for higher interest rates in h’eland.
A box looks at the debate about the possible role of the EMS in
systematically danlaging h’ish competitiveness.
Ahernative exchange rate regimes are examined in Chapter 3, with
special attention to their ability to deal with the identified weaknesses of
the EMS. We distinguish between matters which relate to EC-wide policy,
and options which are unilaterally available to h’eland. Regimes considered
inchtde a fi’ee-float, the single currency (EMU) and a regime of wider
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margins combinecl with a flexible target path for the average value of tile
currenc), against the main tracling partners. The question of whether or
not to have a publicly announced and explicit polic), is consiclered. A box
summarises recent official EC reports on the 1992-93 exchange rate crisis.
In the concluding section we stress the neecl for a credible, stable ancl
wiclel), unclerstood exchange t’ate regime. The events of the past ),ear have
revealed weaknesses on all of these fi’onts. Managecl with greater flexibilit),,
the narrow bancl cotdcl have remainecl a serviceable regime. Nevertheless,
hacl it not been for political considerations deriving fi.om h’elancl’s full
enclorsement of ancl participation in the construction of the European
Union, the narrow band EMS woulcl never have been the regime of choice
for Irelancl. We must take advantage of the new fi’eedoms to establish a
regime which is more adapted to the specific needs of the country.
Chapter 1
CURRI~VCY POLICY: WHAT CAN IT ACHIEVI:?
The power to create currency is a deceptive one which can achieve less
than is often supposed. Badly regulated, it can be disastrous. Many a
hyperin flation and many a recession have resulted from a mispercel)tion of
the role and fttnction of cut’t’eocy policy. Aldlough a perennial topic - the
production and regulation of money has been a matter for government
policy for centuries - it is still a source of disagreement among both
academics and policy practitioners. This chapter reviews some of the
cut’vent practice and thinking in an area where few simple prescriptions
are universally valid.
Although a predominandy private banking system generally performs
most of the ftlnctiolms of time monetary system on a purely commercial
basis, the unit of account in which it deals is currency, afJd l.he production
of currency is a government monopoly. This monopoly, historically
employed as a means of securing revenue for government, is nowadays
managed in a wider public interest. Time stability of dine pttrchasing power
of money is high on the list of objectives to be sought for this field of
policy. At the same time, there at-e competing objectives for currency
policy, especially time need to inalntain wage and cost competitiveness. This
second objective arises because most contracts, il~cluding wages, are set in
terms of money. The apparent ease with which producers’ costs can be
ad]ttsted relative to those in competing countries by a change in the
external value of the currency often leads to calls for currency
depreciation in the interests of securing competitive advantage, or of
recove ring a loss o f co mpe titive ness.
Price stability and competitiveness need not always be competing
objectives, since time one may often be conducive in the longer run to the
other. In tl~e short i’un, howeveh time}, often apparendy pull in opposite
directions. Can currency policy achieve eit.heh or both? There are certainly
limitations on the degree to which the external value of the currency can
be maintained at time level chosen I)y time government. We hardly need
reminding of that so far as downward external pressure on the currency is
concerned; but there are also cases where it has been difficult and costly
for governments to prevent upward currency pressure from capital inflows.
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hldeed, the nlost inlportant determinant of a sustainable exchange rate
path is not the atttborities’ stock of foreign exchange reserves, but the
adoption of a coherent set of budgetary and macroeconomic policies. In
the absence of such policies both domestic and foreign agents will (in their
wage and price setting behaviotn" and in capital movements) take actions
that directly tmdermine the currency. FnrLbernlore, the macroeconomic
imbalances resulting from inconsistent policies, whetber reflected in
interest rates or unenlployment, will render the policy politically
unacceptable and lead to its abandonment.
All in all, modern opinion tends to limit tbe range of objectives to be
sought through currency policy.I Promotion of growth and reduction of
inequalit), are among the important policy objectives which are best left to
other policy instruments. A bad currency policy will binder their
achievement; a good currency policy is a defensive one wbich creates
enabling conditions for other, more positive actions by public and private
sector alike.
The experience of soaring inflation in the 1970s, followed by a painful
process of disinflation, has tilted tbe balance of priorities for currency
policy in the direction of price stability. In several countries the central
bank’s mission has been clarified in that sense, and greater independence
given to the central bank to pursue this objective in a more or less single-
minded manner. But no central bank is altogether insensitive to real
economic developments; issues of competitiveness are never wholly absent.
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed dlat, whatever is attempted on the side
of maintaining competitiveness, there must be a "nominal anchor" for
policy enstn’ing some degree of price stability.
1.1 The Nominal Ancho*"
Policies designed to ensure maintenance of wage competitiveness are
not gnaranteed to deliver price stability. Indeed, because losses of
competitiveness tend to trigger policy response more qnickly than gains in
eonapetitiveness, there is usually an inherent bias towards inflation. The
same is true of policies designed to stabilize interest rates.2 What is needed
to keep inflation under control is a ])olicy anchor lowered to prevent
IThe cost of foreign debt is often raised in tiffs context, especially when dex~duation is
on tile cards, but it is usually a red herring (Annex 1).
~rherefore. the nominal interest rate is not a nominal anchor. [t ~-.~s Wicksefi who first
pointed out a century ago that stabilizing interest i’;ttcs could easily restlfi in ;i cumul:tLive
inllationary proces.s.
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tlominal or money prices fiom drifting in the swirling eddies of internal
and external macroeconomic Coladitions. Such a nominal allchor can be
established through targets for some nominal magnitude such as the
aggregate quantity of money or credit, nominal GNP or GDP, or in tile
exchange rate. Each of these has been suggested for inflation control, and
there has been a lively debate over which is best.
Controlling the quantity of money or credit has been tried in many
industrial countries, especially since the 1970s. Data for tracking the
monetary aggregates are available quite quickly, and there are normally
sufficient policy instruments to allow the authorities to keep tile monetary
aggregates close to the target path if they are determined to do so. A rule
for monetary growth will generally translate into a broadly comparable
inflation rate, but experience shows that the link is a fairly rough one - not
suitable fbr fine-tuning price stabilit),. Shifting demand for money due to
financial sector innovation3 is a particulai+ problem, both for the ease with
which the money target can be hit and for its impact on inflation. If such
shifts are not recognized as such, they could trigger an inappropriate
policy response imposing an undtte dellation or a temporary increase in
inflation. Another difficulty is in knowing just how much corrective action
to take. Monetary policy has its impact with a fairly long and variable lag;
this inhibits fine-tuning, and can result either in a whipsaw pattern of
unduly vigorous corrective action exacerbating economic fluctuations oL
on the other hand, in a timidity of policy with too little action being taken
too late. Generally speaking, a money target is insensitive to general
economic conditions, and ttsing il: to lower inflation can result in severe
recession, as was evident in tile UK in the early 1980s.4
By targeting nominal in.come rather than inoney, tile risk of cattsing a
recession may be reduced, but it is a good deal harder to track a particular
path for nominal income, especially since the telex,ant data appears only
with a lag. GNP data for h’eland are compiled only on an annual basis:
even preliminary data are not available fi’om official sources until tile
middle of the following ),eat’. Accordingly, in h’eland, nominal GNP is not a
practical target or nominal anchor for short-run policy.
Tile exchange; rate offers a particularly useful anchor for small open
economies, because of its quick impact on the domestic price level. The
speed of this link between exchange rates and prices, which has I)een
3A recent comprehensive study of the demnnd for money in h’eland in contained in
Hurley and Guiomard (1989).
4Reliance on monctntT nggregalcs hns diminished in the US and UK, thotlgh tilt:}, ;ll-e
still influential in GCl’lllany.
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extensively documented for h-eland,5 guarantees that an exchange rate peg
will restdt in a close correspondence between the consumer price inflation
at home and in the country to whose currency we are pegging. Unlike the
aggregates, there is no delay in determining what tile nominal exchange
rate6 is; accordingly one source of policy lags is removed. It also has the
advantage of offering a very simple and visible policy rule.
But it is the price level itself that has been growing most in popularity as
a policy anchor among monetary policy specialists, especially in large
counwies. The advantage of tile price level is its quick availability and tile
fact that, unlike dae monetary or income aggregates, it needs no decoding.
The problem of long and variable lags in response to corrective action
remains.
1.2 How Far Can Currency Policy Hell) Maintain Competitiveness?
In a country as small and as open as Ireland, trade prices ,as well as
domestic prices are highly sensitive to international developments. Most
h’ish exporters have little or no market power and for many years have
invoiced in foreign currency;7 likewise for most importers. Thus a change
in the value of the Irish pound does not usuany have much influence on
the terms of trade - the relative price of imports and exports. Instead, its
main potential effect is on wage competitiveness, to the extent daat wages
do not respond so quickly.
However, the speed with which wages do respond increased during the
1970s, especially in response to a depreciation of the Irish pound. Such a
depreciation, by its impact on consumer prices, tended to lower the
purchasing power of wages and resulted in wage renegotiations to recover
this lost ground.8 This tendency, known as real-wage rigidity undermines
the effectiveness of exchange rate depreciation as a means of improYing
wage competitiveness.9 In contrast, a sudden appreciation of the currency
5 Recent contributions here include Honohan and Flynn (1986). Callan arid Fitz Gerald
(1989), Kremers (1990), Wright (1993;i and b).
6 As already noted, the real exchange rate, whether corrected It)l- differences in
purchasing power or ~-age z-ares, does n~t provide a nominal anchor.
7 Mottiar and O’Rcilly (1981). An Bord Trficht,’ila (1993) indicates that less than 15 per
cent of h-ish exports :ire invoiced in Irish pounds, with about 25 per cent in sterling.
S Honohan and FI)’nn (t986). That h’ish wage response is relatively rapid by
international standards is documented b)’ Be:tn, I~a}~tr¢l and Nickell (1986).
’~ If a lowering of real wages is sought, it may be attainable, if at all, only through
incon’Les policy or through n socially costly period of high unemplo),ment. These i,la)’ have
been rele~-.mt at different limes during the 1980s, Ihough So what extenl is controversial:
neither route is gual"anteed success. These wider issues of labour market policy are beyond
the scope of the present paper.
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may not result in a symmetric lowering of nominal wages. Therefore
currenc), appreciation may damage wage competitiveness even if cttrrenc),
depreciation does not help it.
It would take us too fat" afield to enter into a lengthy discussion of
whether real wages in lrel;tnd are "too high". But some general
considerations deserve to be noted here. First, rapid increases ill real
wages undoltbtedly put competitive i)ressure on existing firms, leading to
job losses and closures. Tile inlpact of higher wages on attracting new
firms, whether domestic or foreign, is also cleat- and has been
documented, especially in tile context of competition fi’om tile Sottthern
European periphery. Probably a majority of economisLs would agree with
Ole assessment that tile relative real wage growth in Ireland over the past
quarter centur), has been an important contributor to disappointing
eml)loymetlt growth over the same period. On the other hand, account
must be taken of the SUl)ply of labour and of the role of migration.
Migration flows are largely determined by availabilit), of jobs, with some
contribution fi’om relative social welfare benefits, but access to the UK and
The Exchalage Rate Regime in Some Smaller Indttstrial Countries
Finland, Iceland and Austria provide inlercsling examples of small
prosperous countries on the fringes of the EC with varied exchange rate
experience.
zlttsltia
A quiet success sto~’y, Austria has seen ies living standards rise to the OECI)
average, comp.qrecl with less than two-lhiJ’ds of Ihe average in 1950 - the
f~lstest catch-up of any industrial cotmttx,. The engine of growth has been thc
mantll.tcttH+ing sector with machiner)’ and efltlipment eXl)Ol’tS to the l~.)t’e.
Unemployment has been in the region of 3--,1 per cent lot the past decade.
This success has been ;tchieved with a z-cmarkable stability in intlation and
external payments: the Eul-rent aceotlnt has been balanced or ill small soFphls
I):~r a decade, and inllal.ion has averaged 3.1 per cent per annum over the
same period. General government borrowing has been between 2 and 4 per
cent of GI)P in recent ,ve~trs, allowing a gentle decline in the debt-to-GDP
ratio. About 40 per cent of laaerchandise tracle is with Germany, and in 1982,
Austria converted a de facto DM link - the Austrian Schilling had depreciated
b), only 3 per cent since 1971 - inl,~ a lbrmal link which has sur’vived to the
present. In the words of a recent OECD report "despite the potetltial ~lclverse
imp:~et ona competitiveness, the hard currency policy has probal~l), benefited
u’,qde as it has kept price and cost pressures down and contribtltecl to stability
of expect:tticms in trading n’clal:ionlships...It has also promoted str~nctuu’al
change, since international price competitiveness had to be maintained
through stead), improvemenus in tMit htbotli" cost.s (in local ctll’l’enc), terms)
relative to competitor countries" (OECD, 1993).
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other labour markets means that relatively depressed real after-tmx wages
probably also contribute to out-migration. Furthermore, while modest
gains in wage competitiveness can reliably be expected to result in
expanded exports and employment, a severe cutback in real wages (as
advocated by some) may not resuh in a commensurate boost to .jobs, at
least in the short run.
Wider dimensions of competitiveness than simply wage competitiveness
are important in the medittm and longer term. Product and process
innovation to control Costs and achieve international nlal’ket penetration
are uhimately more powerful instruments in the struggle for bigber living
standards and more rapid economic growth. A soft currency policy
designed to ensure wage competitiveness may, by removing some of the
pi’essure on existing firms, paradoxically result in weaker overall
competitiveness in tbe longer run. Tbis approach has underlain, for
instance, the currency policy of Ausu’ia for many years. On the other band,
Icebznd
Heavily dependent on the fish-catch, and to a lesser extent on the market for
alnminium. Iceland has tried to cope with its volatile fortunes with moneta~,
financing of government deficits and an exchange rate policy that has
generally been accommodating of the resuhant inflation. Over the period
1970-89 this has resuhed in an acute inl]ationary bias to policy, with average
annual inflation of 32 pet" cent. Still, other features of the economy have
been tavourable: living standards ,~re not fat" short of the OECD average, and
unemployment aveJ-aged less than I pet" cent in the 1980s. Since 1987, the
economy has been in recession, wilh per capita output now running almost
10 per cent below 1987. Unemployment excceded 2 pc,- cent in 1990,
approached 4 per cent in 1992 and is beading Ibr over 5 per cent in 1993.
Declining fish catch has, as usual, been responsible for most of the deSeline,
but on this occasion the fiscal and especially the exchange rate policy
response has been different. In late 1989, the attthorities pegged the v,’alue of
the krona Io a trade-weighted basket of 17 currencies; in 1992 the basket was
narrowed to the ECU (76 per cent) the dollar (18 per cent) nnd the yen (6
per cent). The decision to peg was much less half-hearted than previous
attempt.s to stabilize the currency, and inflation fell fi’(nn 21 per cent in 1989
to 15 per cent in 1990, 7 per cent in 1991 and 5 per cent in 1992. It is
noteworthy that wage inflation also slowed, so that real earnings per worker
actually declined by 7 per cent in 1990 and showed little growth in the
fl:~llowing two years. The exchange rate crisis of Autumn 1992 led the
attthorities to consider a wage freeze and tax policy measures to deal with the
conse¢ltlences of sharp depreciations of the cnrrellcies of iml)ortant
competitors, but opted instead for a 6 per cent depreciation of the peg.
Following the devaluation, interest rates jumped by about 2 percentage
points reflecting a loss of confidence by the markets.
CURRENCY POLICY: WHAT C.&N rr ACHIEVE.~
the ability of the productive sector to cope with ever-increasing real wages
is limited, and a macho approach to exchange rate policy is likely to result
in a collapse as has happened to hard-exchange rate policies at the centre
of countless Latin American stabilizalion programmes over the past
quarter-century. So here too is a question of balance and realism.
1.3 Theory of Optimal Exchange Rate Regime.~
Should exchange rates be flexible or fixed; if fixed, to what should they
be fixed; if flexible, what indicators should guide policy in their regard?
The variety of regilneS operated dtroughout the world reflects the diversity
of opinion on these questions and the diversity of underlying conditions in
Finl,’lnd
The collapse of iLs eastern markets in 1991 - exports to the Former Soviet
Union fell fi’om 13 per cent of total exports to 5 per cent in that year - was a
severe blow adcling to the slowdown which had ah’eady hit the Finnish
cconom)’, and which was a reaction to unsound credit-fine, need
overcxpansion in the late 1980s. The ensuing recession has been
exceptionally clcep and protracted, despite a recove~3’ of competitiveness
helpecl by a vcr,v sharp currency depreciation. The value of the Finnish
markka had been linked to a trade-weighted basket since the 1970s, with
progressively wider fluctuation margins (widened to +/- 3 per cent in 1989).
But in the part five years, the markka has followed the path of a roller-coaster:
in the boom ),ears of 1987-88, it was allowed to appreciate (first within the
band, and then with a 4 per cent upward realignment) in order to dampen
export demand, though this led to capital inflows and lower interest ~tes,
boosting domestic demand. During 1989 the widening current account
deficit led to a reversal of sentiment, and downwarcl pressure on the markka.
This pressure increased when the new government announced iL,~ decision in
1991 to switch from the trade-weighted basket to an ECU-peg. Even thougla
this peg was introduced wilhout a realignment at first, speculative pressures
(resulting fiom the deteriorating tnnde and output situation) that built up
again towards I.he end of the year proved irresistible and the markka was
devalued b)’ over 12 per cent in November 1991. Ahhough this created a
competitive advantage which allowed considerable diversic, n oF export
capacity into Western markets, 1992 was chaJ~, clerised by furllacr declines in
clomcstic expenditure (including tightening of fiscal policy) high interest
rates and a surge in tmenq)h)yment fi-om "4.5 per Gel’it in 1990 to 7.6 per cent
in 1991 to 12.7 per cent in 1992 (and reaching 18 per cent in 1993). IZurthcr
speculative pressure resulted in I.he currency being floated on Scplcmber 8,
1992, and by FebrttzuT 1993 it had fallen b)’ one-third in two ),ears to a level
which ~tl I~LSL allowed a considerable reduction in money market intcl’CSt i’a(es
to levels lower than they had been for ),ears. An cxplicil inllation target was
announce b)’ the authorities to guide the floal, and for thc present intlatinn
remained al arotmd 4 per cent.
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different countries. One view that would generally be agreed is that
exchange rate regimes should not be changed very often. Stability of the
exchange rate regime represents an element of the financial infi-astructure
allowing for long-term planning and a coherent basis for the design of
contracts. Uncertainty about the regime certainly weakens inflationary
discipline without providing any compensating benefits for employment
growth.
The literature on choice of exchange rate regimes has evolved in at
least four main waves in the post-war period. The findings and insights of
researchers in dais area are manifold, but it has proved to be a complex
field, resistant to simple and uncontested policy prescriptions.
An early stage in the literature raised the issue of the optimum
currency area, in terms of an area within which there is sufficienl: labour
mobility to avoid the emergence of uoemplo),naent in the face of shocks
affecting one region. Such an area would be an appropriate one in wlaich
to have exchange rate fixity, but regions or countries with isolated labour
markets would do well to retain some flexibility in order Io allow full
employ~nent to be maintained in the face of a loss of external demand.
Later on analysts tried to infer optimum behaviour through revealed
preference by working back fi’om the actual pattern of regime choice and
discovering what country characteristics were associated with observed
regimes. Though dlere are many exceptions, there is a tendency for large,
closed economies to choose floating exchange rates, while small open ones
choose fixed rates, except where fiscal and monetary discipline is not
adequate to support this.
Later still, economists became interested in d~e ability of exchange rate
regimes to insulate countries from various t)q~es of external and internal
shocks: a number of mathematically sophisticated papers explore the
circumstances under which different regimes will do this, and tile
policymaker is invited to choose the regime which best insulates fi’om tbe
most prevalent types of shock affecting the country in question. For large
economies, the story here is more complex than for small, open
economies where the adjustnaent to shocks is achieved chiefly through the
effect of exchange rate changes on real wages.
The most recent branch of the literature focuses on the discipline
effect of exchange rate regimes in a game-tlaeoretic context and seeks to
examine the effects of adherence to a particular regime on the ability and
incentive for governments to maintain a self-fidfilling reputation for price
stability. A fixed exchange rate peg to which tile government is credibly
committed can act as a powerful anchor against inflationary surges. Thus,
a focus of research has been the potential for countries both within the EC
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and outside it to benefit from tile anti-inflation reputation of the
Bundesbank by tying their currencies to tile DM.
As already indicated, the conaclusions from this research are not
decisive, but if there is a common theme in recent writing, it is that
adherence to a nominal anchor must not be slavish (Cf. Williamson, 1993).
The disastrous consequences of sticking with a grossly overvalued
exchange rate have been evidenced by many episodes in the developing
economies. The role of overvahmd exchange rates in worsening the effeces
of the Great Depression of the 1930s have also been highlighted. While
there should be a nominal anchor, the gales may occasionally (say once a
decade) blow so hard as to require weighing the anchor and making for a
more shehered anchorage.
1.4 Exchange Rate Pegx in Practice
International trends in the choice of exchange rate regime is shown in
Table I, which reveals the declining relative importance of exchange rate
pegs during the 1980s.I° Almost one-third of countries have moved from a
peg to a more flexible exchange rate regime in the last decade or so, with
comparatively few moving towards a peg. The disturbances in the EMS
since September 1992 have swung seven’al smaller industrial countries
(Finland, Norway and Sweden), along with Italy and the UK away fi’om
pegs and into floating regimes. In practice small economies, and those
without diversified exports, have traditionally favoured exchange rate pegs,
but in general it is not easy to predict the exchange rate regime that a
country will choose on the basis of structural characteristics of the
economy (I-tonkapohja and Pikkan,’ainen, 1992).
A su,’aightforward peg provides the most secure exchange rate anchm,
provided the peg is to a currency that has low inflation. Half of the
countries with a pegged exchange rate fix the peg to just one currency,
mainly the US dollar.II The other half use a basket or ol.her mixture of
currencies. They include tim 9 members of the ERM, as well as currencies
pegging to the SDR (a basket of the 5 largest currencies, with the US dollar
having a weight of 40 per cent). But most have adopted their own basket,
corresponding usually to national tn’ade patterns.
I°Mosl of the countries involved au’e in the Third World :rod some face diffi:rcnt issues
in exchange rote policy; c£ Aghevli et aL (1991), Corden (1993), Quirk and Cort~.~l)ouglas
(1993).
11 Also induded are the French fi-anc for a group of African countries (nnostly fon’nnen"
French colonies), the Russian n-uble for some fi:wmer rcl:~ubJics of Ihe Soviet Union, and a
handftd ~,f others.
Pegs
US dollar
French franc
Russian ruble
Pound sterling
Other single
SDR
Other currency composite
EMS
Indicators
Rexible
Managed floating
Independent floating
Limited flexibility
Total no. of currencies
Table 1: Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: IMF Member States
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990     1992
94 95 94 91 94 85 84
39 38 34 32 36 25 24
14 14 13 14 14 14 14
6
I I 0 0 0 0
3 4 4 5 5 5 6
15 15 tl 10 8 6 5
22 23 31 30 31 35 29
8 8 8 8I 8 10 9
4 5 6 6 5 3 3
34 38 39 45 43 52 71
20 20 21 22 23 23
12 19 17 25 44
7 : 5 4 4 4
140 1461 147 150 150 150 167
>
-7_
>.
,-3
O
t,./3
-r
c
7=
7=
O
Source: International Financial Statistics
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The more complex the peg, the less difficult it is for the authorities lo
adjust it inconspicuously, and therefore the less visible a discipline it
represents for anti-il~llation policy. A basket peg tbat is constandy being
revised is a clragging anchor. Still, by choosing a basket, a country partially
insulates itself fl’om shm’p fluctuations in the ~.,alue of its currency against
most other currencies, such as might easily happen with a single currency
peg, given the volatility of the main floating currencies. A handful of
currencies without a peg adjust the vahle of their currencies on the basis of
indicators of competltiveness.
1.5 The Problem of Multiple Partner Currendes
Most of the current interest in h’ish excbange rate policy lies in the fact
that our un, de is distributed widely among countries wbose currencies have
fluctuated widely in relative value. Tbis presents a number of problems,
both to exporters and importers, and to the analyst. At the risk of
labouring tile obvious, it is worth spelling out some of these implications.
First is the question of export profitability when a partner currency
depreciates - the case of tile UK recently. While small countries such as
h’eland are price takers in the world market, this is not altogether true of
larger countries such as tile UK. Tbus, a fall in the relative price of sterling
vis-t~-vis the DM will nol i’esuh in a quick and filll increase in all sterling
prices in die UK to compensate. ,,Ms a resuh, Irish exporters to the UK may
be faced with lower prices expressed in h’ish pounds and hence with an
erosion or elimination of profitability. The problem must not be
overstated. For one tiring, other exporters to the UK market will be in the
same boat, and this will immediately place upward pressure on tbe UK
price, especially to the extent that UK producers are not in a position to
supply tile domestic market fully at the lower price, or anyway because they
wish to expand exports because of the relatively higher price prevailing
outside the UK. Furtbernaore, cost pressures resulting froln the
clevaluation both directly, and inclirectly through higher wage settlements
as the inflationary effects of the clevahlation begin to be feh, will drive up
the price at which UK producers are willing to supl)ly the market.
Eventually, the "law of one price" will bolcl sway once more.
"rile adjusunent process oudined above will often be a protracted one
(especially where imports clo not supply much of UK consumption of the
product) and it is not likely to restore the position that prevailed
immedialely before the devaluation: after all, the devaluation was
prompted by the emergence of disequilibria. It is neverlheless important
to recognize that much of the sudden loss of profitability for Irish
exporters will be transitory. The ability of those exporters to continue to
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supply the UK market during the transition will depend, for example, on
tile degree to which their cost structure is sunk or committed, on tile
degree to which it is important for them not to lose workers with
specialized skills pending price recover), in the export market, and on tile
capitalisation and financial structure of the enterprise. It is in these
dimensions that a number of h’ish exporters to tile UK are thought to have
been vuhlerable. Furthermore, some may hnve expanded their operations
in recent years to take ad~,,antage of booming demand and unsustainahle
UK prices: for these, tile adjustment to equilibrium will not be enough to
restore the profitability they had briefly et~jo),ed.t2
A second issue raised by divergent movement.s in differeHt partner
currencies is the qttestlon of measuring and interpreting the data on
currency movements. If it weakens against some Ctll’rencies and
strengthens against others are we to say that the h’ish pound is
appreciating or depreciating? Tile simplest approach is to take an aver’age
of partJler cnrrenc), movements, weighted by each cottntr),’s share in Irish
trade. A variety of weighted average measures are available (described in
Honohan, 1979), some of them taking account of the consideration that
exporters to (say) the UK are competing not only with UK producers but
with producers from different parts of tile world. Unfortunately, since tile
end of the sterling link, the divergent movements of sterling and other
currencies have restdted in such weighted averages giving rather different
ans~,ers. Ftn’thermore, there is the question of modifying trade weights to
take account of specific product considerations. Thus, it is arguable that
exports of agricultural produce subject to effectively guaranteed Irish
pound or ECU prices should not be assigned to the currency of lhe
destination country.13 Likewise, trade in products produced with a low
labour co]ttent might be weighted differently to tile extent that our
interest is in nlaintaining wage competitiveness.14
12Considel,’nlion of the~ issues needs to be supported by a more detailed analysis based
on hard facls. The submissi~.Jns of many enlerprises Io Ihe Market I)evel~q~menl Scheme
would likely provide a ~’ahtable soul’ce of such intbl’nlatit)ll ,~nd should be c:lrcl’tdly :lnal}7.cd
(sttl~iect, ofcl~urse, to maintenance of strict confidenliality) in order to gain a be(ter
ttnderslanding of the degree of vtdcJerabilit), of Ib¢ h’ish markt:t to, sterling fltlcluations.
13The CAP creates otller problems: the profitability of secondary processors of
agricultut,’al produce - 5;itch as biscuit producers - can be bit by measures designed to
insttlatc" pl-imaJ)’ proce~ors :rod Ihe farmer fi’om cxchat~ge i~llC ch:mge.
I’lh is surprising th;~t no official body in h’el,~nd publish¢:s an index of wage
competitiveness al better Ihan atmual frequency. Tbis should cert:fi~dy be rectified. The
data in this paper are based on the three mabl trading partners only, :uad I.be weights used
are sc.~mewhat arbitJ~uT (Annex 3 itlusll’ates die effect of changing the weights).
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But a nlore serious nleasurement difficult), is that an average, however
weighted, does not do justice to tile asymmetry of effect. All enterprise
faced with closure due to loss of competitiveness ira one market may not be
balanced, at least in tile sbort-run, by expansion of employment in other
enterprises geared to exploit incl’em~ed profit margins in other markets.
In sum then, though measuring them is as yet a most iml)erfect
science, divergent movements of parmer currencies create transitory, but
nonetbeless damaging, sbifts of profitability.15 Because they are transitory
and because shifting production to other locations is costly, it will not be in
the interest of most enterprises to respond suddenly to every shift in
relative currency prices. Instead, they will take a long-term view of likely
relative costs before making location decisions. They will also structure
their finances to allow for" fluctuations in profitability induced by currency
movements, and tile), will hedge tbeir very short-terln receivables or"
payables in the forward foreign exchange market or otherwise.16
1.6 Defending a Peg Agaim’t Specu&tors
Recent events may suggest that the currency is necessarily
unconu’ollable-bobbing about on a turbulent sea of speculation. Can any
given excbange rate peg (or a target band) be reliably defended any more?
There is no agreement on this point, though even before the disturbances
of last Autumn, many economists pointed out tile vulnerability of the EMS
to speculative attack. An extensive theoretical analysis17 emphasizes tile
vulnerability of pegs in general to speculative attack in tile absence of
effective exchange controls. A speculative attack is much more likely - and
simply brings forward tile date of devaluation - wben domestic
macroeconomic policies make the peg tmsustainable anyway. Those who
discount the importance of destabilizing speculation argue that a
speculative attack which drives a currency away fi’om the value tbat would
equate long-term demand and supply is likely to be loss-making for t.be
15The impact on imporl prices, and through them collstllilcr prices, musl not be
neglected. [tldccd, Ihese may become Celltra] in the po~ilica] de|)alC about ctlrrcncy
iI’batler$.
16Measurc8 Stlch as the Market l)evelopmcllt Scheme. ilall’oduced in lalc 1992, and
attcnlpting to il~Sttlate inaJlufacturcl~ fi’Oln the decline in sterling, could have the adverse
side-clTect of reducing the incentive for these enterprises Io arl-ange Iheir at]’ailS so that
they can cope with such |]tlCltlaliozls.
17C1". S’,’tZlIIISOll (1992a), Knlgmala and Rotemberg (1992).
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speculators, and therefore less likely to occtu’. But even if policy is coherent
and credible, a speculative attack may induce a policy response which
validates the attack ex post (higher wage settlements and credit expansion
in resl)onse to a forced devahtation, for example). Furthermore, even if
financial markets correctly price assets on average, it is inevitable that,
especially if offered the prospect of a large gain, tile), will make many
individtml pricing errors, which could include the value of the h’ish pound.
Given this pessimistic assessment, what is to be done to minintise the
risks? We take for granted the general and obvious reqttirement of a
credible policypackage consistent with exchange rate strategy being
maintained (and that inchtdes being able to deliver the package).
It is clear that speculation cannot be outlawed as such in our type of
open trading economy, where what we term pejoratively as speculation is
only an aspect of a spectrum of mostly useful financial activities. Modern
economics textboo "~ define speculation in terms of tile transfer of capital
risk from those unwilling to assume it to those who are. Sellers of a
devahtation-prone currency may be on either side of this market,
depending on the vulnerability of their overall financial position to
exchange risk. Most financial and non-financial companies try to avoid
assuming foreign exchange risk. In particular most financial companies act
as intermediaries by pooling or diversifying risk. Indeed most banks place
strict limits on the risk that their foreign exchange dealers can assume.
Non-financial companies that do otherwise are acting unwisely: their
internal controls and strategies should be mttch more effective than
legislation to limit such behaviour. ~qlile there are professional spectdators
who enter the market accel)ting high risk with a view to high returns, most
of tile problem for tile attthorities arises when, in the form of the Central
Bank intervening in the foreign exchange market, the attthorities
themselves become tile only or main assttmers of risk. Private speculatdrs
in sttch circumstances are assuming only a small risk relative to tile
expected return: the authorities are giving them a I)argain. Trying to find a
way of achieving exchange rate stability without offering that bargain is the
contlndrllnl which faces tts.
Three possibilities have been suggested in this connection, and are
now considered. First, exchange controls, and analogous quantitative
measures; second, a foreign exchange transactions tax; third, wider
margins or target zones.
Many eeonomisLs forecast that elimination of exchange controls would
increase the freqttency of destabilizing specttlation in tile EMS. Note,
however, that the most severely affected currency was tile potmd sterling,
which had been fi’ee of all exchange controls for more than a decade. It is
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the liberalisation of financial markets generally, and the greater
international integration of tile industrial economies, more than the
removal of exchange conu’ols per se, that has increased tile difficulty of
pegging exchange rates. Indeed, it is doubtful that exchange controls
could be very effective in the modern en~’ironment. Those that could be
enforced would slow tile outward movement of funds a little, and could
considerably reduce leveraged speculative operations, but they would still
be insufficient to maintain a peg not thought credible by the market.
Furthermore, their rise over a prolonged period introduces all kinds of
distortions by divertitlg fnnds through unpoliced channels.~8
As an alternative to reintroduction of exchange controls there have
been suggestions that other types of administrative control could be used,
including a limitation on bank lending, as speculators who do not own
Irish pounds have to borrow them in order to sell them specnlatively. The
only merit to such a scheme relative to more traditional exchange controls
is that it might not contravene EC undertakings. The same types of
distortion would emerge: to whom would the rationed loans go, and at
what price?
It is also argued against exchange controls that their use in an
emergency indicates a reluctance by the authorities to face up to market
realities, and Ilence is uot conducive to the market participants believing
that the government has a coherent and creclible policy approach. Such
confidence arguments are difficult to evaluate, and probably depend
sensitively on timing and other contingencies. For instance, an increase ill
i~terest rates, wblcb is the first line of defence agait)st the speculators, is
often praised at first, as revealing that tile authorities are prepared to take
politically unpopular actions in order to maintain the parity; later on,
successively higher interest rates can destabilize confidence if they are
interpreted as desperate or last-dilch attempts to discourage sl)eculation
I)efore tile inevitable devaluation.
A tax on foreign exchange transactions has been advocated (most
notably by Tol)in) as a means of reducing the incentive for speculation.
The proposal is that a "modest" rate of tax - say 1 per cent - would not
malerially affect international trade, but would be enough to discourage
purchases and sales of currency that are merely motivated by a small
probal)ility of moderate exchange rate gain. This proposal has recently
been reiterated in the EMS context (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993).
lSt\ i~, ther negalivc e~.’altlatiOla of Irish eXpCl’icnce with exchange controls i8 contained
i. Malhieson :lll¢l RI.}jIIS SIl;ll’t:z (1993).
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While the proposal might stabilize floating currencies, it is hard to see how
this would work reliably for the EMS, where potential overnight gains as a
result of devaluation can be up to 8 per cent. In addition, tbe proposal
neglects the vohnne of spot and foreign exchange transactions which occnr
in the normal course of trade: each commodity trade may trigger several
foreign exchange transactions in order to hedge risk. Some estimates put
the total value of foreign exchange transactions in h’eland as high as 25
times GDP. Accordingl); even a 1 per cent transactions tax would cascade
into something larger than it appears at first sight. %q]atever about the
merits of a scheme introduced at the European level,19 it is quite clear that
unilateral introduction of such a proposal is totally infeasible: it would
simply drive the entire foreign exchange business of the Irish banking
system off-shore.
That leaves wider margins. Briefly the point of having wider margins
(in the context of reducing the impact of speculation) is to allow for
necessary realignments of central parities to take place without any
discrete jump in exchange rates at the time of realignment. If there is to be
no discrete jump, the potential gain to correcdy anticipating a realignment
and speculating against the currency is greatly reduced. Thus, identifying
wide," margins as a remedy for speculation is based on the observation that
speculation against a weak currency is not only practically riskless (the
currency will not quickly rise in the band) but potentially involves an
enormous gain relative to the net interest co.4t of borrowing the weak
currency for a few days. The wider margins remove the enormous gain,
and eliminate the lottery character of the foreign exchange market. With
the lottery closed, the gamblers will move elsewhere.
The same reasoning applies with stronger force to the proposal
(Williamson, 1985) for a weaker form of band or "target zone", where the
authorities would not undertake to defend the band absolutely, but would
undertake to conduct their monetary and fiscal policy in sucb a way as to
push the currency in the direction of the band were it to slip out of the
band due to market forces.
19h can be argued that both exchange controls and foreign exchange transactions
ta.xes are incompatible with the move to an increasingly open tl~, ding environment and the
financial liberalisation which have characterised policy in recent years, and are seen by
some as being at the hezwt of the ~llrope;tll single iil~tlkel concept.
Chapter 2
IRELAND’S MA CROFCONOMIC I~XPI£RII’~NCE IN TI-IF~ EMS
This section provides an overview of h’eland’s macroeconomic
experience in the EMS. We argue that in some dimensions - inflation,
competitiveness, unemployment - membership Ella), not }lave altered
economic performance as much as is often thought. On interest rates,
however, there do appear to have been generally adverse consequences.
We also describe realignment policy anti note how difficult it is to
characterise the EMS experience in terms of tile concept of a "nominal
anchor".
The 1978 decision to participate full), in tile Enropean Monetary
System had far-reaching consequences, both for tile structure of tile
financial systeln and foE" macroeconomic developments to tile present.
There were also more subtle influences on the trend:shift towaE’ds
commercial and financial relations with continental countries at tile
expense of die traditional relationships with tile United Kingdom.20
h’eland was surely more affected t.han any other EC COtEnt-t’)’ by the
introduction of tile EMS. Although other exogenous factors also played a
role, tile initial sitie-effects of EMS membershi[:~, namely die inu-odncdon
of exchange controls and tile abolition of tile one-for-one sterling link,
were decisive for monetary developments in the following decade. Tile
EMS introduced a really independent interest rate for tile first time, and it
also introduced cttrrency transactions costs and exchange risk to a very
wide segment of Irish economic activity. Though compensated by interest
subsidies, these were damaging features.
2.1 Wage Competitiveness
On wage competitiveness, though, tlqe picture was not as negative as
has often been portrayed. In fact wages increased by about 1 per cent per
annunl faster Olan tile average of our trading partners, after adjusting for
exchange rate changes, though relative to EMS countt’ies tile increase in
2°And there ~,’as some conseqttential distortion of cross-I×~rder u~,de (though here tax
considerations were probably more important).
19
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earnings w~ mttch higher. This is illusu’ated by Figures I to 4. These show
the movemenm in average hourly earnings expressed as a proportion of
the weighted average of the State’s main trading parmers, all brought to a
COlllnIOll base and corrected for exchange i’ate changes. An increase in
this index means a loss of wage competitiveness.21 A number of features
may be noted about tile data. First, the rate of increase of tile index was as
high or higher in the couple of years before EMS began as in the
subsequent period. Second, tile index is quite volatile, reaching a peak ill
1986 before subsequent reversals: this derives fi’om the movements of
sterling and the US dollar and illustrates the difficulty of maintaining
stability in competitiveness against the background of volatile worldwide
exchange rate movements. (For reference, the average trade-weighted
index (EER) of the h’ish pound - not adjusted for wages or prices - and
the bilateral exchange rates against tile pound sterling, the Deutsche Mark
and the US dollar are plotted in Figures 1~18.)
21Fhus, for example, he cnuT 105 fi:~r 1992 in Figure I means lh:ll earnings had, since
98.~, increased by 5 i)er cent more th~ln in Ihe avenge of the Repul)lic’s t~lding i)arulcrs.
after adjustnlcnl fi~r cxch;mge r:ltc changes.
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Figure I has the most COlaal~rehensive Cotlnll’)’ coverage, but is only at
annual "requency.e-’ h indicates an average loss of wage competitiveness
of less than I per cent per annum, 1975-93.
Figure 2 is at quarterly fi’equenc)’, but only includes UK, Germany and
US as comparators.23 B)’ fitting a log-linear trend to the data, we obtain
an average loss of 1.3 per cent per annum over 1971-93, bill only I.I
per cent during 1979-93. Thus the quarterly series indicates a slow-
clown in the loss of wage competitiveness during the EMS period.
Figure 2
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Figure 3 shows the deviations of this index from a linear trend, and
highlights sudden losses of competitiveness ill earl), 1983, early 1986 -
the peak of the series is in the second quarter of 1986, just before the
unilateral devaluation of that year- late 1989 and late 1992.
Figure 4 looks at wage competitiveness against just tl)e UK, a
comparison which is of particular interest because of tl~e labour
intensity and low-margin nature of much of Irish exports to the UI~
Despite considerable fluctuations, this bilateral index shows no trend
over time. The index peaked at I I I at the end of 1986, compared with
99jttst after tile 1993 devaluation.
At what rate, if any, a steady increase in relative wages is sttstainable, is a
matter which is open to debate. On the one hand, a catching-up process of
living standards would impl), such an increase. On the other hand,
catching-ul) requires a steady increase in the marginal productivity of tile
workforce if employment is to be maintained. While average productivity
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of labour in manufacturing has jurnped over the ),ears, this is largel),
atu-ibutable to tile addition of odler factors of production, and to tile
closure of old low-productivity firms. That marginal productivity may ,lot
have been growing adequately is reflectecl in the disappointing
emplo),ment performance, especially in industr),.
The loss of wage competitiveness would, of course, have been higher
had it not I)een for frequent devaluations - and not just the 8 per cent
devaluation of mid-1986. In fact, the Irish pound w~as devalued against the
Loss of Competitiveness in the EMS
Tile issue of how serious ~s the loss of competitiveness in I+be early )’ears of
the EMS is highly conu’oversial. Authors who bare stressed dlis as a problem,
such as Dornbuscb (1989), Kremers (1990) ~md l.,eddin (1990), kwe tel~ded
to look mainly at either relative movements in consumer price indexes or, if
they look :~t wage ~,’ates, to use the EMS counuics as compar,~tors. Both of
these involve important biases. Focusing on consumer price inllation is
n~arred b), the fact that an important contribution to consumer prices
intlation in heland during 1981-83 was the imposition of very much
increased illdirect taxation - I.be ratio of Ctlsloms, excise and VAT revenue to
personal consumption rose from 22 per cent in 1980 to almost 28 per cent in
1983 - an increase which wouk[ imply a contribution of about 8 per cenl Io
thc level of consumer prices. Though they may lead to higher wages being
negoliatcd, such indirec; taxes have :l negligible direct effect on
competitiveness. Likewise, confining the comparison to the EMS countries
wholl), neglects tbe strength of sterling arid the US dollar in those ),ears, a
strength wbich helped the competitiveness of h’ish firms even as
competitiveness vis-A-vis the EMS cun’encies was being eroded. On tbe other
hand, published dao otl competitiveness using unit labour costs provide too
ros), a pictul’e, because ral)id structural change in h’isb manufacturing
industry towards enterprises with a low labour share in value added metals
that changes in unit labour COSLS gl’eady overstate the avel’age produclivity
gain of enterprises.
Since wage competitiveness depends both Oll exchange rate ancJ wage
illovenlenL~, the role of exchange rate i)oliey in inlluencing competitiveness is
onl)’ a partial one. Provided wage-setting institutkms are sufficicndy Flexible,
:m), nominal excbange rate movement can I)e offset b)’ changes in wages. The
fact that wage competitiveness u-ends have not been noticeably different as
belwcen pre- and post-EMS reflects this abilily of wage-setting to
ac¢olnnl,3dale to gradual exchange rate n]ovelllCnts. However, in practice,
wage rates adjttst over a time period nlc;k~;ured in quarters, whereas exchange
h’ntes can change dranaatically over periods measured in da}’s or weeks. Thus
the abillt~, of an exchange i’alc regime to slnoo(|l exchange tale inovelncnLg
(e.g., tbrougla defensive realignments to offset sudden changes) is arguably
illOl"C inq~ortant for conlpetil.ivcness Ihall the average Lrend in zlolninal
exchallge rates.
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DM no fewer than 7 times between 1979 and 1987 -just about once a year
on average.~4
Government did make an attempt to limit public sector pay increases
as part of the programme to stabilize the public finances. Tile main
motivation for this, and for contraetionary fiscal policy generally in the
1980s, came from a recognition that the rapid growth in government debt
was unsustainable.~5 It was ,as a beneficial side-effect that fiscal contracdon
contributed to the lowering of infladonary pressures in die labour market,
but inflation reduction was not the driving priority and in particular there
was no strategy to engineer or force a high exchange ,’ate in order to
squeeze out inflation. This point is brought out below in the analysis of
realignment policy.
Figure 4
Woge Competitiveness
Irelond vs UK
114
112 -
tO8 -
;06 -
;04 -
102 -
100 -
95 -
96 -
94 -
92 -
90 -
88-
85 -
84
24And that is the releValtl meastll’e becatlsc experience shows that rcalignlllellL~ do 11ol
affect the US dollar ~’alue of the I)M: thus the realigning currencies :ldjusl around the pivot
of the DM (Honohan and /’,tcNelis, 1989).
-’5Gea~T (1992) pro~4des an account of the debate about fiscal adjustment in Ireland,
together with references.
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2.2 hzflation and Unemployment
To what extent was it membership of the EMS that contributed to
lowering hish inflation over the ),ears? The question is not an easy one to
answer, combining as it does issues of political economy with those of
macroeconomic linkages. At the level of political economy, it may fairly be
said that the EMS tmdonbtedly provided a kind of brake on an)’ tendency
that might have emerged for aggressively devaluationist policies, though
that wotfld also have been u’ne of adherence to the sterling link.
Looking at the d),namic evolution of prices in Ireland, the UK and
Germany during the EMS (Figure 5), no deflationary impact of the EMS is
very evident. Before the EMS began hish inflation was always close to that
in the UK, for obvious reasons. This correspondence was quickly broken
when the EMS began, and Irish inflation at first (1980-82) surged far ahead
of that in the UK and also increased relative to that of the other EMS
cotmtries. Of conrse inflation drifted lower as the decade went on, but was
that due to factors other than EMS participation? After all, UK inflation
also fell rapidly. On the one hand, cross-cotmtry research indicates that
h’eland is one of the countries whose policy response to inflationary shocks
Figure 5 Inflo[ion: Ireland, Gery-nany, UK,
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w,xs more disciplined in the 1980s daan previously. On the other hand, the
most plausible alternative policy at that stage - a continuation of the
sterling link - would surely have produced lower inflation in those early
years - as in the UK.26 In this connection it is worth tloting that (~L~ shown
in Figure 6), over the whole period since 1979, cumulative h’ish inflation
has been just a little higher than dlat in the UK, and the exchange rate has
returned to vicinity of parity - much as the purch,xsing power parity, theory
of exchange t~, tes and inflation would predict.
Figure 6
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But if the EMS h,xs not helped us to get a much better inflation trend
than that in the UK overall, it has not fully insulated us from the generally
depressed employment trends in that economy either. Links between h’ish
and UK unemployment remain very strong,27 and the recent surge in
29Admittedl),, n looser exchange Ktte regime, such as a floal without nn), :mchor for the
price level, could easil)’ have resuhed in an up~,’ard drift in inflation to Icelandic levels.
"°TCf. Honohan (1992) which .also explains the ndjustment~ to the two series made in
Figure 7 to make them comparable and consistent. See also Browne and McGetlig~an (1993)
for a more comprehensive discussion of the factors influencing emplo)’mcnt and
tmemplo)~llent.
IREI~ND’S MACROECONOMIC EXPERIENCE IN THE EMS 27
unemployment here is tmdoubtedl), linked to the contemporaneous sharp
deterioration in UK enaployment conditions. The links here are illustrated
in Figut:e 7, in which unemployment in the Republic and the UK are
brought to a comparable scale. The figure shows that each major surge in
UK unenlployment has been soon followed b)’ an increase in Irish
unemployment. Declines in UK unemployment have also been u’ansmitted
back across the h’ish Sea, though more slowly, and the 1987-89 decline in
the UK was too short-lived to make much of an inroad into the Irish figures
before the most recent surge took over.
Figure 7
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2.3 hzterest Rates
By comparison with interest rates in German),, an investor in h’ish bank
deposits would have done far better, even after taking account of the
declining exchange rate of the h’ish pound against the DM. This is an
important difference by comparison with previous experience in the
sterling link when Irish interest rates scarcely deviated fi’om near-equality
with the UK.
These points are illustrated in Figures 8 and 9. Figure 8 shows short-term
Irish and German interest rates. Figure 9 combines these with exchange rate
98
Figure 8
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Irish ond Germon Interest Rotes
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movements to show tile cttmulative excess i’etn[’os received by a holder of
Irish (wholesale) deposits ’,vonld have made relative to holders of (~erman
and UK deposiLs respectively, measnred fi’om the start of tile EMS. Tile gains
are shown by tile relatively steady upward trend in tile DM line after 1979,
contrasting with tile flatness of tile sterling line before 1979.28
While the very large government borrowing which was ttndertaken
dtn’ing this period prohably contributed, a leading explanation for tile
trend is that tile EMS has a built-in devahtation risk and that, try as it ma);
no government can fnlly eradicate this perceived risk, resulting in a
interest rate pt’ellliuln -- SOmetimes called a peso-factor because it was first
noticed in Mexico.
Another asl)ect of dewtluation risk is seen in tile fact that movemenL~ in
tile value of sterling have systematically prompted interest rate increases
here, evidently ,"us a result of tile efforts of investors to hedge Oleir positions
against the risk of a devaluation. This is not quite as easy to see fi’om the
raw data (Figure 10 plots the de-trended Irish pound-DM interest
differential against the Irish l)otmd-sterling exchange rate tip to August
199‘2). However, regression analysis29 shows that every 10 pence fall in the
value of sterling has tended to be associated with an increase in money
market interest rates of the order of ’2.5 i)ercentage points. This has
happened both before devaluations (as in tile period Noveml)er 1992 -
.January 1993) and during el)isodes which were not followed hy a
devaluation (as ill 1989-90, or in early 1985).
Since long-term fixed interest horrowing is comparatively rare in
Ireland for all but tile largest of companies - and tile State sector -
fluctuations in short-term interest rates have tended to be largely passed
back onto tile smaller corporate and household borrowers, who thus carry
most of the risk of these speculative surges. In the most recent episodes,
not all of tile fluctuations in inoney market interest rates were passed
through to the smaller borrowers (that this could he done reflected, in
part, the continued existence of intet’est-ft’ee or non-intel-eSt sensitive
categories of deposit). Still, much was passed through, and it is widely
at’gned that tile high levels of nominal intel-est rate had a more severe
effect on tile economy dttring the recent crisis than had the loss of
competitiveness against sterling.
2&l’hc generally high sterling interest i,ntes ill the 1980s are also cvi(lent fl’om the figure in
that the excess return on Irish pounds t~i.*-,~-t*i.s sterling, though very x’arial)le, averages out at
dose tO zelo. This COlIII’~ISIS with Ihe negative excess returns expel-ienced by both Irish potmd
and slcrling holders relalive to the I)M in the late 1970s (Holaohan and Conroy, 19931)).
~*Ct’. Honohan alld Con i’oy ( | 993a), O’ LealT and mangan (1993), Walsh (1993).
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Exchange Roles & Interest Rotes
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ComparativelT little research has been done on how small corporate
borrowers cope wida fluctuating interest rates. In the US, it is known fi’om
recent research (cf. Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993) that interest rate increases
lead to a contraction of bank credit for small firms but not for large, and
that this squeeze on small firms plays an important role in converting a
credit crunch into a recession. Neglect of such ;ts),mmeu’ies between small
and large firms may thus have resulted in some economists
underestimating tile role of cost and availability of credit in influencing
inacl’oeCOllOlnic develo])ln ell ks.30
The experience of h’ish pound interest rates in the EMS has been
somewhat unique. Cross-country anal),sis31 shows that most interest rate
fluctuations in EMS countries are driven b), two factors: one of these
factors inf]nences all of the Ctll’rencies to some extent; the other is
essentially an unique h-ish pound factor. Thus, especially with the UK out
of it, the EMS gives ns rather high and peculiarly volatile interest rates, and
these interest rate movemenLs are damaging for economic performance.
We therefore have a special reason in h’eland to take die lead in analysis
and advocacy of reforms in exchange rate arrangements in Europe.
S°Thcir important role in die hotzsing market is, -~f course, well-known.
SlKocdijk and Kol)l (1992).
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2.4 Did the EA4S Provide a Nominal A~tchor for heland?
Durit,g tnost of the EMS period, it is not clear that a nominal anchor
was being used in h’eland. Between realignment.s, of course, adherence to
the EMS did provide short-run stability. But at the relatively frequent
realignments that occurred in the EMS over the period 1979-87, the
position adopted Ibl- the Irish i)ound tenc|ed to I)e relatively weak, and
resuhed in a cumulative depreciation of the central parity against the DM
of al)out 29 per cent by January 1987 (and 36 per cent by Febl-uar), of
1993). So it is cleat" that the DM rate was not an ancfior. Nor was the ECU -
against which I:he h’ish pound was depreciated I)y I’t per cent I)),January
1987. It is hard to find any general rules that applied to the h’ish pound in
the I I realignmenLs in the period 1979~7. Clearly, Ibr no country (other
than The Netherlands) did adherence to the EMS involve anything like a
fixed nominal peg against the DM throughout the period, h’eland’s
expecience in the EMS can be broken into five sub-periods.
l’hase I: 1979-82
In the firsl., rul~ning fi’om the I)egirmiHg to the end of 1982, Ireland
was (unlike Belgium, Dentnark, France and Italy) able to avoid any
consl)icuous crisis in the first 3 years of tfie system, thanLs mainly to the
strength of sterling dtuilag that period.32 Even so, the October 1981
realignment allowed the Ol)l)Orlunit), for a timely devaluation (5.5 per
cent against the DM) thereby reversing a relatively rapid loss of
COml)etitiveness associated with sterling weakness that Autumn.
I"hase 2:19,93-86
B)’ early 1983, renewed sterling weakness put acute pressure on the
h’ish pound, and the realignment of March 1983, involving an Irish
i)ound devaluation o1"9 per cent against the DM was a welcome respite.
lk,leanwfiile fiscal contraction and lower world commodity prices helped
to slow domestic price and wage inflation sharply to close to German
rates. Nevertheless, in 1986 sterling weakness brought the h’ish l)ound
to 95 pence sterling (despite a 3 per cent devalual:iotl in April), and the
competitive threat l)osed I)y this, ¢ombitled with the fact that the dollar
had also I)een weakening (so that the effective exchange rate index for
the h’ish i)ound was 13 per cent above its value of 15 months
previously), induced art unilateral devaluation of 8 per cent.
32Even so, the Irish potmd had dcl)reci:lted ag:finsl the I)M by I I per cent I)v inid-1982,
:is oplnl)arcd with 19-22 per cent for Ihe ,I weaker inenll)ers. :Md only 2 per cetll t~1" the
Dutch guildt:r.
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Phase3:1987-90
The competitiveness gain following the 1986 devaluation allowed a
lengthy period of stability, helped along by strength of sterling during
1988 and much of 1989. This stability was evident too for other
members of tile EMS. With h’isb wage and price inflation now running
at very low rates tile idea that there might not need to be any more
realignments involving the Irish pound gained credibilitT. An export
boom, rising emplo}~nent and lower unenlploynlent, combined wida a
successful stabilization of the public finances also contributed to the
sense tbat devaluation conld safely be ruled out as an option. Thus the
renewed sterling weakness of late 1989 and into 1990, though it did
result in some increase in domestic interest rates, did not trigger a
devaluation. This was the clog that didn’t bark, and suggests that
exchange rate policy bad hardened.
Phase 4:1990-92
Because it removed the main drawback of the EMS as an exchange rate
regime for Ireland, the two-year period of sterling sterling membership
in the ERM must be singled out as a particular phase of our EMS
experience. At first it might have seemed an ideal situation, removing
at last the risk of wide fluctuations in the bilateral rate of exchange
between the two pounds. Unfortunately, Britain’s adherence to the
system, especially at an over-optinfistic excbange rate, carried die seeds
of the system’s demise.
Phase 5: Since SeptmnbeT 1992
Fottr months of turbulence for the Irish financial markets followed the
withdrawal of sterling fi’om the si,stem in September 1992. That event
did not necessarily entail a devaluation of the Irish pound, I)ut as
sterling fell precipitously, tile possibility of devaluation became a
pressing question. The appreciation of the effective exchange rate
index was admittedly lower than bad occurred over a period of months
before the 1986 dewalttation, but it was no larger than bad occurred at
end-1989 when there was no devaluation. Still, the dt,’amatic nature of
tbe sterling collapse (along with turbulence in tile Swedish, Italian and
other currency markets) focused attention on tile sudden loss of h’ish
competitiveness in a key market, and led to expectations, justified in
the end, that a devaluation would have to follow. Though sterling
continued to depreciate following the h’ish devaluation, its movement
was subsequently reversed so that, by tile 0me of the collapse of the
narrow margins regime at the end of ltdy 1993, the h’ish pound was
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close to pre-crisis levels against sterling, and well down on its 1992
values against other major cttrrencies.33
Some measures would suggest that the h’ish position in tile EMS was
overall a fairly weak one - a drifting anchor:
At 2 realignments the Irish pound was more depreciated than any
other currency (April 1983, August 1986)
Whenever more than 3 currencies were devaluing, so did the h’ish
pound; conversely (except for the tmilateral 1986 devahmtion) the
Irish pound never devalued against the DIvl unless at least 4 other
countries were devaluing.
At no realignment did more than 2 currencies depreciate against the
h’ish pound.
Given the more urgent policy priorities that prevailed in the early
1980s, and the rapid disinflation that did occur an),way, this pragmatic
approach proved adequate in the circumstances. Indeed, a tougher
exchange rate policy could have been quite damaging. Thus our analysis
contradicts the statements of comment~ttors (such as Dornbusch, 1989)
who assert that a tough exchange rate policy was adopted by h’eland within
the EMS even in the early years. They appear to have overemphasised the
relative stability of the h’ish potmd rate against the DM in the first daree
years: we have seen that was achieved only because of the strength of
sterling. In retrospect, the only period of sudden loss of competitiveness
which did not lead to a devaluation was the 1989-90 period, when the
economy was otherwise strong. It is also noteworthy that, as shown in
Figure 4 above, wage competitiveness against the UK has not deteriorated
over time.
Thus, as already mentioned, the achievement of lower inflation by the
mid-1980s was more a side-effect of fiscal contraction at home (with
associated high tmemployment and moderation of wage settlements) and
worldwide disinflation, than the resuh of an aggressively hard currency-
induced squeeze on domestic costs. Still, even if the system did not provide
a definite and fixed anchor, nevertheless it placed a practical harrier to any
33hadeed thtr cfl~:ctive exchange rate index had Ldlen to i~ lowest figure for alnl’Los; ,t
)’e:lrs.
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tendency for resort to inflationary or devaluationist policies. Thus it is
clear that the authorities regarded their position on realignments as a
defensive response to competitiveness loss, and never used them as a
means of achieving a competitive advantage. For most of the time
devaluations had to await a general realignment, and the authorities
preferred taking a middle course to an extreme position. The August 1986
devaluation was a response to a sudden loss of competitiveness on a scale
unlikel), to be rel)eated more than t~vice a decade or so. The evidence for
attachment to a nominal anchor is better for the later period 1987-92, but
subsequent evenLs showed that the authorities’ ability to hold on to the
anchor was not absolute, and that occasional defensive realignments wottld
continue to be on the cards.
Chapter 3
THE DII~ECVlTON OF Flfl’Ul~d~ I"OLIC Y
Flaving iclentilqed excessively high interest rates, speculative surges, and
the vulnerability to sterling movements as the chief weaknesses of the olcl
EMS regime, we turn now to consider the merius of alternative exchange
rate strategies for Ireland, a topic which has sudclenly I)ecome of central
importance. After all, with margins of fluctuation of +/- 15 per cent, the
h’ish i)ouncl is in an altogether new Wpe of regime. [I is a regime which
allows for something very close to a free-float, or for a much tighter
relationship with EMS or non-EMS currencies, especially if one envisages a
flexible approach to realignments. In fact, the new wicle-margins EMS does
not fully clefine the regime in which the Irish pound is operating.
Some of the options which one woulcl like to consider are not
immecliately available, in that they del)end on EC-wide agreement. Thus
we divide our discussion in two main sections; the first is devoted to what
h’eland should be Imping for in terms of reform of the EMS, as it now
stands, and especially in terms of the desirability of moving to the single
currency. The second section focuses on regimes that are unilaterally
available to h’eland, whether or not they are fully compatible with the EMS
anti thus we include a discussion of the free-float, advocated by some.
3. 1 Reform in the EC: Is the Single Curre.ncy an Attraaive Aim?
The reaction of many policy-makers and economisu~ to tbe suspension
of the narrow-margins EMS seems like a collective sigh of relief, and this
response has certainly not been misplaced so far as h’eland is concerned.
The discussion of the previous chapters provide little reason lot h’eland to
support any move to reestablish the old regime, and there is, in any event,
no al)parent likelihood that such a proposal would soon attract much
supl)ort elsewhere in the Community. (In case it does, we offer some
suggestions below as to how the h’ish pound should be managed in a
restored narrow-band EMS.) But the Maastricht process of convergence to
EMU is now interrupted, without any clear path for the fimu’e monetary
evolution of Europe. The question of European policy-makers blazing a
new trail to the single currency will soon I)ecome a I)ressing one, and it will
be important for h’eland to have a clear idea ~L~ tO whether ill is fully in
lavour of the single currency or not.
35
36 AN EXt~MINA’rlON OF IRISH CURRENCY POLICY
3.1.1 Tile Single Currency: Risks ancl Benefits
The aclvantages for h’eland of a single currency system are
considerable. To sumnaarize an extensive debate which was widely aired
around the time of the Maastricht Treaty,34 the main advantages of the
single currency include microeconomic gains of the elimination of
transactions costs, and stabilization of inflation at a low rate through
removal fi’om the political arena of a policy instrnment whose awtilability
(according to a large body of economic literature) can actually reduce
economic welfare even if governments are well-intentioned.
Many British commentators have expressed the fear that adherence to
a single currency would remove an important degree of freedom in
macroeconomic acljt~stn~ent for individual member states. The point is well
taken in so far as the economic shocks that would give rise to the need for
exchange rate adjustment fall unevenly or asymmetrically on different
members of the EMU. (If all members require the same adjnstment, then
this is still available and wonld be effected by the European Central Bank.)
This is a worry more for large economies such as the United Kingdom
than it is for h’eland. For one thing, as mentioned, h-ish nominal wages are
relatively more flexible in adjusting to external cost-price shocks. Imported
increases in prices - for example through an exchange rate change - are
relatively quickly translated into wages, and this also happens, though
somewhat more slowly, for declines.35 Real wages are not easily changed by
external nominal shocks, thus constraining use of the exchange rate as a
means of lowering real wages on a sustained basis. Again this sbould not be
overinterpreted: exchange rate changes do have real effects: the point here
is that they are smaller and less lasting in h’eland than, for example, in the
UK.
Of course it would be better if the UK were also a member, but even if
it were not, the single currency would remove the damaging interest rate
fluctuations, even if fluctuations in competitiveness vL~-A-vis the UK would
remain. Pending fnrther research, this remains a matter of judgment, but
the balance of advantages seems to favour h’ish membership. On the credit
side there are the micl’oecolaomic savings from avoidance of foreign
exchange transactions costs and the elimination of exchange rate
341 reviewed these issues in my 1991 paper. A much inore detailed, if i’alher pal’lisan.
review :q)peared in Commission of the European Communities (1990), a critical
commentary is pro~qded by Bean (1992).
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uncertainty in markets accounting for over 40 per cent of exports. The
avoidance of speculative interest ~,te surges and elimination of tile stead)’
"peso premium" on interest rates is also a plus.36
The main negative element is tile volatility of sterling and an inability
to adjust exchange rates to deal with this. v~qmt if sterling should weaken
sharpl), with Ireland in tile EMU and thus withoul the option to devalue?
Admittedly, exports to tile UK - which account for almost one-third of the
total - are relatively labour intensive on average,37 and many labour
intensive firms supl~lying the domestic market are also exposed to
competition fi’om Britain (Bakeh 1993). But a resumption of the secular
trend, interrupted during tile Lawson boom, away from low-margin
exports to the UK will progressively narrow tile range of companies whose
viabilit), is threatened by sterling movements. Besides, such companies will
ah’eady have been examining ways of reducing their vulnerability through
financial hedges and appropriate contracting with unions, suppliers anti
customers.
It is sellZevident that a single currency would benefit tile elaboration of
cross-border economic relations on tile island. Tile fact that little such
activity was observed in the sterling link period is a reason for caution
against expecting too much here. But even if some of tile hopes and
aspirations for expansion of such activities have been overstated by some, it
is clear that exchange rate stability and a lack of transactions costs, as
would be provided by tile use of a single currency would remove severe
barriers to mutually beneficial small-scale cross-border economic activity.
That is not to say that all of the Maastricht plans for EMU are well-
conceived. There is good reason to worry about tile deflationary effects
across Europe of an attempt to meet tile arbitraL’),, and in several respects
too restrictive, fiscal guidelines (Cf. Bean, 1992; Buiter, Corsetti and
Roubini, 1993).
hnperfect thottgh its detailed design may be, tile single currency still
represents tile best way forward. It follows that a rapid move to the single
currency should be favoured. But the single currency now seems at the
very best still 6 years away, and may never halgpen. Is there anything that
can be done in tile interim?
~6Gee’tler anad Gilchrisl (1993) discuss how damaging credit crunches c:m be, especially
fi.)r small firms.
"~7Somc are insulated from exchmlge rnle effects bv lht: operatiou of lhe Con|n|oll
Agriculluz~d Policy, though Ibis insulation is not pcrfcct and does elol ~xleel(I to all food
processing concerns. Olhers forn~ pa]’l of the worh:lwlde operalions of i~tlllillati¢~e~;~l
colnpanics ;ll’ltl aft i-t~l:ltively i115A~nsitiv(2 to sl~rlil’lg movemcl~ts
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One idea, far-fetched dlough it may seem at first sight, would be to
leap-fi’og tile process by abandoning our own curl’cncy altogether and
adopting tile DM38 as the legal tender of h’eland. The major advantage
would be that, by abolishing our own currency, we could never be hit by
specific peso-factors driving up ottr ioteresl rate in anticipation of a
de~,aloation of our curl’ency. Tile mechanism woulcl be a legal redefinition
of all h’ish pound conu’acts in terms of tile I)M and the retirement of Irish
pound currency in favour of new issues of tile DM. Without the co-
operation of tile German attthorities ,~ issuers of the DM this would be a
costly exercise, as the Central Bank would have to borrow the DM notes
and coin and service those borrowings.39 This cost - the seigniorage -
would now ohimately to tile German authorities, and so it is not
ttnreasonable to suppose that an agreement could be arrived at greatly
t+educing or eliminating altogether tile cost. The political feasibility of this
option is not unrelated to tile prospects for the single currency as il could
be seen as a stepping stone on the way there. Would the loss of sovereignty
in this unilateral al:)andonment of our ctwrenc), really be unacceptable,
given that we do not object to EMU? This option is admittedly a rather
radical one, and its technical implementation would require a number of
legal and adminisu’ative changes. But it should not be ruled out on that
ground alone.
In this context mention must be made of proposals to narrow tile
margin of fluctuation of the h’ish pottncl against die DM down to 1 per
cent or so, as was clone in tile last couple of years by tile Belgian
attthorities, for example.4° The idea seems to be that annotmcement of
narrower margins will encourage a market belief that tile current parity is
irrevocable. This is an altogether clifferent proposal to the adoption of the
D~,,I as Otll" ctlrrency, ancl has mttch less to recommend it. Narrow margins
encourage specttlation by making it less risky. Policy annotmcements l)*;r se
do not have a reliable effect on confidence. Given our vulnerability to
:"Sit has been suggested to me Lhal the French ft’zttlc miglax also be n c;mdid:ltc.
"~:~Vc ;irtz talking of a sum to be borrowed of al)oul £1.5 billion - q~r about 6 per CelU oJ"
C, NP. II ~’ould involve only a slighl degree of rhet~rical tlourish to remark tll;~l Ihc slims IOSl
ixl the I~Lilecl d~fencc of the currency over the pasl winter ~’oltld have covered 2 or 3 )’cars of
the necesszuT servicing.
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EC Committee Reports on the 1992-93 Crisis
Two high level EC Committees, tile Committee of Governors of tile EC
Cenmd I~,an~s, and tile MonctmT Commiuee (with n’epresentativcs of Finance
Ministries as well as Centre, I Banks), have reported on the lessons to be drawn
from I.hc 1992-93 EMS crisis. Though there are differences of clnpfiasis and
style, both papers identify two mael’oeeonomic causes of the crisis: a creeping
competitive ovefvalualion of some countries (UK, Spain, haly) which had
been ;dlowed to emerge because of a growing tendene), IO treat the EMS as
already a quasi-monet;uT union; and tile high interest rates necessitated I)},
tile C,~.’rman authorities’ decision to finance the eosls of C.ermali unification
by non-inllationary borrowing. The proximate causes were the Danish
rqjeetion of the Maastricht Treat,v and tile impact on weaker EMS currencies
of expansionatT US monctar), policy.
Apart from the usttal pleas for gl’eater attentiOll to fiscal and iiiol’lelal’y policy
eonvet’genee, tile t-emedy, ill the view of b¢~dl veporl~, is quicker action Ol~
realignmel~ts when they are seen a~s needed, and this may require i)artner
eottzltJ’ies to take the initiative in proposing a realignment I~r a etlrrcney
whose i)arity they consider ttnsustainable. ~,~hether Ol" nol a parily is
sustainable will depend inter alia on tile credibility of the govcrnnlent
eoneerftcd, and in particular on its track record in formulating realistic
targeu; and in meeting them.
I)ealing with speculal.ion requires decisive action in raising interest rates in
the first instance; delay here may raise doubts ,as to authorities’ willingness to
defend the parity, and (by allowing the currency to fall to the bou.om of the
band) reinforces tile potential for speculative gain. But the reports recognize
that the authorities may be infilbiled from using high interest I-ales by such
factors as the size of public and private debt (in particular the share of
floating rate debt), the level of unemph:Jymenl and the speed of transmission
of money market interest rates to sensitive lending rates. These points cartT a
resonance for h’eland.
II1 contl’ast, the i’epot’ls downplay the relevance of public slatClllelltS and
exchange markel intervention in suppol-ting a currency. These can be
counterproductive, they say, and there is accordingly no decision to
strengthen co~pet~lion on this front.
sterling movenmlatS, it would seem a reu’ograde and unrealistic step to try
to adhere to narrower margins against the DM. Much tile same argunlent
can be made against trying to hold 2.25 per cent margins unilat.erally
against the DM.
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3.1.2 What if the EMS Narrow Band Were Restored?
Although many public statements have been made to the effect that
the wide-band regime is to be tenworar}; it does not seem very likely that
tile narrow band EMS will return. Still, for completeness, we should
consider how tile Irish pound should be managed within tile EMS narrow
band. The main message of i’ecent months in this regard is that an unduly
rigid approach to realignments w,~ not helpfnl. We would have to returll,
as indeed we did in early 1993, to an acceptance that defensive
realignments must be considered in tile face of externally imposed
competitiveness shocks. This is sometimes expressed as a return to tile
i’egime of the early 1980s, bnt that would be an over-simplification, and
would risk discarding the gains that have been made in terms of reduced
wage and price inflation. In the 1980s the authorities realigned
opportunistically to maintain competitiveness for a period of years when
nominal wage inflation in Ireland was considerably higher than that in
Germany. Having eliminated that differential, it wonld be important not to
allow it to re-emerge by ineans oft I,’~x realignment regime which nfight be
expected to accommodate domestically generated wage inflation. Policy
should not be allowed to generate the kinds of shock that might trigger the
need for a realignment.
A greater degree of domestic flexibility, particularly in wage
settlements, could reduce the need for resorting to realignments (and
domestic flexibili~, will be especially ~aluable in the EMU context). But in
the EMS - whether witb narrow or wide bands - defensive realignments
should be seen ~s a nornlal and correct response ill certain circtnllsU.lnces,
and not as a necessary evil or a defeat. It is to be hoped tllat greater
international co-ordination on realignments will institutionalise this point
in the fnture, as advocated in the recent official EC reports. The new
European Monetary Institute would evidently have a role to play in this
context.
It is sonaetimes held that to realign indicates a loss of credib!lity and
risks placing ns in the second tank, with otw access to the single ctnTency
of EMU potentially compromised.41 In fact, credibility is lost by adherence
to unsustainable and unrealistic policy choices. Adoption of a coherent
and sustainable exchange rate regime will give comfort to foreign official
and pri~,’ate circles, and make our application for EMU melaabership more,
rather than less, credible.
41And indeed the Maastricht criteria require (mistakenly in the view of many)
adherence Io the till’row band withoul realignnletll i1$ :t prer~zquisite for adopting tile single
Ctlrl-ency.
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Tile credibility that government policy has achieved in tile past several
years has been in other dimensions: for instance in its ability to contain
deficit spending and secure low inflation. This credibility was sufficient to
allow a defensive realignment in the face of sterliog’s movemenLs to be
undertaken without that generating any fear of a major resurgence of
inflation or deficit spending. In contrast, government statements ruling
out any realignment bad little credibility in a crisis. A greater degree of
flexibility does not necessarily imply fi-equent realignments even in a
narrow-band environment. Sudden losses of competitiveness of the type
that might u’igger a realignment response occurred as a result of sterling
movements at most 4 times in the past decade. Furthermore, if sterling
were to strengthen sharply, the h-ish pound should take a strong position
on the occasion of a general realignment.
3. 2 I’ossible Exchange Rate Strategies for the hqsh Pound Now
3.2.1 A Floating Exchange Rate
A free float for the exchange rate is an option which has been
recommended by some. The three main currencies - US dollar, DM and
Japanese Yen - all float with respect to each other, and they have, of
course, been joined in the past ),ear by the pound sterling. In addition to
Italy, over the past year several smaller industrial countries, namely
Finland, Norway and Sweden (who join Australia, Canada and New
Zealand and Switzecland in this respect), have.also been forced back on to
floating. But there is a difference in that the choice of this last-named
group of 4 currencies to float has been a deliberate one, not forced by
market pressures.
It is important to recognize that foreign exchange markets are strongly
influenced by many aspects of macroeconomic policy.42 Therefore,
although a COml)letely freely floating currency is one in which the
authorities do not intervene directly by purchase or sale of foreign
exchange,q3 exchange rate movemeots are often the consequence,
4aFIoats are x:n’ely altogether fi’ce, inasmuch as the atxthorities still allow themselves to
inake some use of exchange inal’ket intel’Vention as a SUl)plemel~talT policy inslrulnCnt,
even if they are not lavgeting a particular palh for the exchange rate.
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intended or unintended, of monetary and other policy.44 Indeed, having a
floating currency often has the effect of gearing-up the effectiveness of
monetary policy: fi3r instance a monetary tightening will not only raise
interest rates, but will also usually result in an appreciation of the currency,
both results acting to dampen domestic demand. In the experience of
many floating countries (including the United States and the United
Kingdom in the early 1980s) exchange rate movements in response to
monetary policy have been very sharp and have had the effect of
dampening down an overheating economy more effectively and quickly
than would interest rate inouenlenLs alone45. Ii1 Ireland, the most open
economy in the industrial world, the impact of exchange rate movements
can be dramatic.
v’,qaat underlying policy should be pursued if the Irish pound wel-e to
float? As already discussed, there needs to be at least an alternative
nominal anchor to guide monetal-y and fiscal policy such as a target for the
rate of inflation (as adopted recently in the Canada, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom, for example). Tile attempt to track the desired rate of
inflation will have conseqttences for the exchange rate, but will by no
i’lleal"lS ellStlre a steady exchange rate.a6 Tile inflation rate is a visible
indicatol, but it responds fairly slowly to policy changes and there is the
risk that an unduly lax (or too tottgh) policy course could become well
established before the danger signals fi’om inflation were unalnbiguous. In
other words, by responding to immediate pressures, the authorities might
easily find themselves slipping fi’om policy flexibility to policy drift. That is
one strong reason for being nervous about the adequacy of a floating
exchange rate policy.
’I4ln the early days of Ihe wider margins in August 1993, the role of monetalT policy
and policy expectatit.)ns was evident, especially in the relation between interest rates and the
~’alue of the h’ish pout’ld from day-lc-day. A sharp fall in the currency fi,Jin the 6th to the
9th of August resulted in a sharp jump in money market interest izltes widely interpreted as
reflecting increased p(dicy tmcertainty and a fear that the currency might be allowed to
drift down. Subsequent money market intervenlion by the authorities to lower iuterest I~ates
helped effect a recover3’ of the currency as policy confidence returned.
45Some authors argue that the margins of flucntation in the EMS could have been used
to achieve the same effect, c£ Sven.son (1992b).
46Of course, the inflation target could be supplemented by a policy of smoothing
movements in Ihe exchange rate. Well-intentioned though it mighl be, smoolhing could
exacerbate Ihe risk, mentioned imnlcdiately below, of policy drift vis-(i-vis the nominal
anchor.
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In most circtnnstances, economists typically advocate paying attention
to market signals, and warn or the risks in attempting to hold i)rices away
front market-clearing levels. Such reasoning is sonleti]nes usecl as a basis
rot- advocating an exchange rate float. Bttt tile force of those arguments is
weakened in the case of exchange rates b), virtue of the degree to which
market participants evaluate currencies on the basis of exl)ectations with
regard to fltture government policy. Far fi’om being determined by the
intersection of supply fi-om exporters and demand fi’om importers, the
exchange rate is determined in a market where the dominant i)layers are
deciding between the merits of different currencies as assets. Experience
has shown just bow far the market can move exchange rates away fi’om
l)urchasing power parity.’17 The huge misalignmenLs of rates which could
occur are a strong argument against a floating regime, especially when this
could be avoidecl I)y explicit adherence to an exchange rate rule offering a
more creclil)le nominal anchor.’m
Do floating exchange rates allow lower interest rates? %qaile they can
helI) I)), freeing the domestic financial s),stem from tbe t),rann), of
devaluation risk, this argument has iL~ limitations. (Certainl), the UK’s
experience in the last ),eat- of acbieving much lower short-term interest
rates in a float is not a reliable indicator of our ability to do the same).49
For one thing, the level of price and wage uncertainty would be increased
and this could discourage Irish pound asset holdings. In addition, the high
level of unemploynlent bangs over h’isb macroeconomic policy and is
perceived by potential holders of Irish pounds as a medium-ternl threat to
currency stal)ilit3, - and having a floating policy does nothing to dispel that
I)erception. Thus, a floating h-ish potmd would not have the lowest interest
rates compatil)le with price stability.
It has to be said that, with inflation running at low levels for several
),ears, the adol)tion of a floating reginle would not now be as risk), as it
’lTAccording to calculations b)’ the Intermttional Monetary Fund, and published in
~,l]-ious i~ltes or International Financinl Stalistics. in 1985 the US (It)liar averaged over "15
per cenl al)ovc its average vah~e in 1978-80. corrected for innation differentials. The
ovel~aluation or the i)ound sterling eh]rillg 1981 was even lligher: more than ~7 per cent
above its 1977 average. C~mld h’ish exporters survive such a surge?
’I8cf Krtlglll:lI1 and Miller (1993).
’mFirst, the size of the UK economy is an important factor in its al)ility to operate an
iltdepel~dent monetary i)olicy. Second. the lower shorl-lertn interest raleS are not tlm’elated
to the scale of tile fat[ ill the ~tlue of sterling - leading to some expectation of subsequent
recover),. It is also worth noting that the decline in UK short-term rates has not been
malchcd I)), Iong-l(2rm r;lleS,
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would have seemed ill tile ntid-1980s. Nevertheless, it would have to be
supplemented by an alternative nominal anchor, and building credibility
for that could be difficult. A failure to achieve credihility could lead to a
steep - and presumably unsought - decline in the value of the currency,
fuelling inflation and potentially resulting in difficult industrial relations
and wage negotiations problems as unions sought to restore employees’
purchasing power.
Floating would have the advantage of allowing a speedy and
inconspicuous response to external shocks, including movements of
sterling. But a particular ceiling against sterling would not be guaranteed
by a fi’ee float, and it could result in an even more volatile sterling rate
than we have had. This in turn could make continued snccessfnl operation
of tight margin exporters exceedingly problematical.
There is also the problem that the ERM still has intervention
obligations. A free float could easily see the currency moving outside the
permissible range of flnctuation within the EMS thereby presumably
calling for - potentially fi’eqnent - realignments. Althongh it is unlikely
that Otis could generate a crisis, it is a somewhat awkward featnre of the
fi’ee-float and could damage Ireland’s standing in regard to EC exchange
rate co-operation.
On balance, and taking into account especially the risk of policy th’ift
and the consideration that it could sideline h’eland fi’om the common EC
approach to exchange rate matters, a free float does not seem the best
option. If so, it follows that there should be a definite policy or target for
how the exchange rate itself should evolve. Note that such a policy need
not necessarily he a publicly announced policy; that is a separate issue.
3.2.2 Some Unattractive Forms of Exchange Rate Target
At the other end of die spectrum fi’ont the completely fi’ee float is the
option of afixed current), peg. Earlier, we reviewed this possibility in a rather
special form in relation to the DM as a fast-track to the benefits of the
single currency of the EMU. An economic argument could be made for
the dollar or sterling as equally appropriate pegs, and a political argument
could be marie for the French franc. Any such peg WOtlld provide a
nontinal anchor.5° The problem is that, with our ntain trading parmers
5°There has been a sttggest.ion that the real ~’alue of Irish pound shotdd be pegged to
that of the DM. Such a peg would be compatible with arbiu-arily high h’ish intlation and
would not in itself provide a nominal anchor. It cotdd also restflt in large fluctuations in
competitiveness against sterling.
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grouped in different currency blocs (DM, £ sterling and US dollar), no
simple peg gives a truly fixed exchange rate for us. Any rigid peg risks
making us uncoml)etitive against some major partners (this would have
been true for tile sterling link had it been helcl through 1979 and 1980).
Furthermore, any peg is prone to speculative attack. This would doubtless
apply even to a sterling peg, recommended by some. There is no going
back to the certainties of the old link: even if a new link were at: one-for-
one, it would surely come under pressure if sterling were to strengthen
thematically.
Tile asymmetry of effect, discussed above, whereby divergent
movements in partner currencies could lead to job losses overall, even if
tile average value of the Irish pound bad not changed, has led others to
suggest the strategy of tracking tile weakest of our n’naior wading partners.
This approach is not recommended. It would impart a significant
inflationar), bias, weaken competitive discipline on enterprises and
encourage an expectation of constant bail-out of enterprises, and it would
be wholly inconsistent with adherence to a conlmon EC approach to
currency matters. Besides, its advocates overstate tile difficulties faced b)’
firms in positioning themselves for profitable long-term operation in an
environment of fluctuating exchange rates.
Some countries have operated more complex exchange rate regimes
with reasonable success. Of these, tile crawli~g peg s),stems51 c~tn be ruled
out: though the), provide some form of nominal restraint, it is of a sort that
is suited mainly to high-inflation countl’ies. Another conlplex option would
be management of the currency according to a set of indicators or what
tile IMF term a closely-managedfloat. In this type of regime, the attthorities
typically fix the exchange rate for short periods of time, but also allow it to
drift occasionally in order to track a set of objectives that may be, but more
typically are not, formally announced. Countries that opt for this kind of
regime include countries with a history of high and volatile inflation
(Turkey, Greece, Israel), but also a few low inflation cotmtries which,
because of the diversity of their trading partners, might otherwise opt for
floating rates but ]lave a generally interventionist approach to economic
management (Tunisia, Singapore). Because it allows considerable
5lcz~awling pegs involve depreciation of the currency on :l I)lC-zMnOtlllCCfl schedule.
A~ljustments can bc as freqtlentl), as dnil)’, ,and there may be fluctu.~tion margins. These
systems have I)cen adopted in L:~tin Americ;m countries to briIIg order to the foreign
exch:~ngc markets, typically as parl of a process designed to reduce high inflation gradu.~lly.
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discretion to the attthorities, such a regime could respond proml)tly to
shocks, but b)’ tile same token, a weakness of tile al~pl"oach is its lack of a
nominal anchor.52
3.2.3 Tile Best of tile Explicit Policies: A Trade-weighted qhrget
Because of tile much wider fluctuation margins of +/- 15 per cent now
in effect in the EMS, there is a strong argument for supplementing the
EMS limiLs for tile h’ish pound with a much tighter exchange rate nominal
ancllor. B)’ taking an active role in managing tile value of tile currency
(within tile new margins) in accordance with this sttpplenlentar), anchol,
tile authorities could, to some extent, have their cake and eat it: staying
with the EMS for reasons of political economy,53 but also having tile
possibility of looking over our shoulder at naovements of, for example,
sterling and tbe US dollar allowing a more stable evolution of the average
value of the cttrrenc)’ -- and tile substantial avoidance of the peso-problenl
OIl interest rates.
I:~t;alig’n.ment.~"
However, under tile regime proposed, if tile supplenlentar}’ anchor
brought the currency toward either edge of the new EMS band, then there
should be a realignment of EMS limits to accommodate this nlovement.
Thus, while the EMS limits would be retained as formal obligations, the real
policy would be indicated by the new "supplementary atlchor". Because of
tile width of the new band, realignments wotdd not be fi’equent. If the
nominal anchor was well chosen, it would rarely need to be revised.
While a wider-than-normal (+/- 6 per cent instead of the usual +/-
2.25 per cent) band was used 19), ltal), (ttntil early 1990), Spain, tile UK and
Portugal, it had not been recommended for tile Irish pound at tile start of
the EMS in 1979. Tile reason for not opting for wider margins then is
equally a reason for supplementing tile very wide margins now, namely
that such a wide baIid would lack any disciplinary effect. There is also tile
prolglem that sharp inovemetlts withill the very wide band illcrease
uncertaintT and can cause competitiveness - or inflationary - problems. A
strategy for movements within the band (and for defensive realignmcnus
when necessary) can help reduce tile amplitude of such fluctuations.
5Zl~,c:wing in mitld the fi’equellcy ~d" det~nsive rcaligtmlen~ in the EMS, it might cvcn
be ~fid that Irish exchange rate policy had many of the characterislics of a managed float
during most of the 1980s.
53"]’hoHgh sec ahoy(: Oll the qtlcstion 01" the COllvcrg(:nce criteria for gl,~duation to the
Iinal stage III of EMU.
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The supplementary nominal anchor could, for example, be linked with
an explicit sterling objective.54 But it would seem preferable to maintain
some average value of tbe currency against the main trading partners close
to an announced target.55 Adherence to such a taominal anchor should
provide adequate inflationary restraint by ensuring that Irish inflation
stayed fairly close to the average inflation of the trading parmers, as it is
no~% and would not pose difficulties of transition. A number of possible
averages can be suggested:
The effective exchange rate index, compiled by the Central Bank, is a
tittle-weighted average of movemen~ in the Irish I)ound’s ~lue against
about 10 main trading parmers: it could be used ~ the anchor.
Much the same effect could be obtained by taking an average of
sterling, the DM and the US dollar:56 this would have 01e advantage of
simplicity, and would probably reduce the risk of large movemen~
against sterling. This seems the most plausible Ol)tion.
Alternatively, one could just use an average of sterling and the ECU:
tiffs would be more Communautaire and would probably recluce the
frequency of realignments, I)ut would be less sensitive to the
movemenLs (potentially important) of non-EC currencies.
Note that a trade-weighted target, though it smooths the average
exchange rate value chosen, does not guarantee absolute stability in the
bilateral rate against sterling. Annex 2 reports on some simulations
showing how a wicle margins regime might have worked over the past
decade or so. Althougb 6 per cent margins woulcl uot have recluced the
frequency of realignments, with ]5 per cent margins only 3 realignmen~
would have been necessary. Note, however, that the Irish i)ound price of
sterling - though more stable - is still quite variable. The volatility of
5’q?.ut one can forget about a one-for-one link with slerling being consistenl with no
realignmcn~ in the EMS: the volatility of sterling is simpl)’ too great.
55What is being suggested hcn’e is a target fox" the n~ominal In’ade-weighted ~qdue. This
wotl]d provide ~1 nonlinat anchor. An a]tCrll,qtivc - ]e,ss attl’71cLi~,e il~ present circiinlslances
would be to have a target for the i-e;ll tl’acle-wcighted value; that would have to be
stlppk:mCllt~d by some nolllinal anchor, sllch as ~1 I~ll’gct for inNation or inonctal~’ aggregates.
r’6Eilher with cqu;d weights or (perhaps i)rt:fcrably) wilh a i~lthcr larger weight of up to
50 I)cr cent on stcrling.
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Figure 11
Exchange rates against DM and intervention limits, 1979-90.
Scales vary by Country
sterling with respect to other currencies is too great for a simple exchange
rate rule to provide as much insulation as we might hope for. It would be
possible to tilt the regime in favour of greater stability for the sterling ~,’ate.
For instance, one could have an even higher weight for sterling in the
target, or any of the averages could be combined with a ceiling on the
bilateral rate with sterling. But the more arbitrary the target, the greater
the risk that it might be subject to modification under pressure and thus
the less reliable a nominal anchor it might be.
Although tracking any of the suggested targets conld bring the h-ish
pound to an intervention limit even in the wide-band EMS, wider margins
allow realignments to take place withoutjun~ps in market exchange rates.
Fignre 11 demonstrates how this worked in the EMS.57 The figure shows
daily DM exchange rates for the EMS currencies, along with the
intervention limits for the DM. Note that at some realignments, the new
57The figt~re is taken from Flood, Rose and M;~t|aieson (1991. Figure 2).
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npper intervention limit was still above the old lower intervention limit.
v~qaen that happened, no change in the m~arket exchange rate against the
DM was necessar),.58 This permitted those realiglaments to be implemented
without any large capital gain for speculators. Without the prospect of a
large capital gain, speculation against the currency is unlikely to be strong,
and interest rates need not move to very high levels to limit capital
outflows. Wider margins or more frequent realignments make the
achievement of such oveHapping bands more likely. Italy, for example, had
overlapping bands at each of its 9 realignments against the DM, whereas
h’eland has had overlapping bands at onl), 4 of its 9 realignments.59
An important benefit of the new very-wide margins, then, is that they
can allow the defensive realignments necessary to track a target for the
average value of the currency to be accomplished without any sudden
change in the market exchange rate and thns without the huge incentive
to speculation which we have seen in recent months - a partial relief to the
peso problem is thus provided. Of cottrse, the wider margins are not a
panacea against destabilizing speculation. After all, Spain was forced into
three realignments in a matter of mondas despite having wider margins.6°
But the), certainly help.
A .Soft Bl~fm" Zone
It is clearly important, in adopting a supplementary average target
within the wider bands, to avoid reintroducing the one-way-bet for
speculators. This can be achieved b), following the suggestion of Williamson
(1985) that such a target shottld not be defcnded by rigid intervention
obligations. Instead, the target shottld be represented as a kind of soft buffer
zone: if the currenc)’ drifts outside the zone this will be tolerated, but it will
trigger graduated monetary and other policy action designed to steer
currency back into the zone. In practice, the buffer zone should be about 5
pet" cent wide: movements within the zone would be tolerated freely.61
58Though a discrcte change may happen, of course, and it may be forced if the market
exchange rate before the realignment is higher than the new upper inte~’vention limit
againsl any one of the partner cttrrencies. For this reason, defensive realignments should
normnlly take place before the currency has reached the hottom of the band.
59"the ratios for the other founding parlicipants are Belgium 5/8; Denmark 5/8;
Fl=mcc 2/7; The Nelherlands 2/2.
c’°’Fhough Italy managed to sun,ire for over a decade in the system with wider margins.
and less than 2 years with the narrower margins!
61Though there is no reason why occ,asional day-to-day smoothing operations in spot or
fol’~.’ard foreign exch:mge could not he envisaged as in the past.
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A soft buffer zone wonld not provide an emsy target for speculators, as
the authorities would be able to allow speculative pressure to be absorbed
in exchange rate movements. Its announcement wotdd not give rise to the
problems of credibility of a more rigid system: or in other words not give
too great a hostage to fortune.
3.2.4 Should the Policy Be Announced?
Tbe qnestion of how explicit one should be about one’s exchange rate
policy is an old and thorny one. Traditionally, policy-makers have not
wanted to be too explicit about their exchange market intervention
intentions, and indeed there is evidence that these interventions can be
more successful if not fully anticipated. Furthermore recent experience
with the rigid obligations of the EMS tends to discourage the monetary
authorities from making too many explicit commitnaents. On the other
hand, the absence of explicit nominal anchors certainly contributed to the
great inflations of the 1970s.
Without a clear indication of broadly where inflation is likely to go, it is
difficuh for negotiators to settle on realistic wage contracts. Such an
indication can come either froln an announced commitment to an
exchange rate evolution, or to an inflation target.
Announcing a target zone fen" the exchange rate
Announcing a credible soft-buffer exchange rate target zone seems a
rather low-risk strategy in this context, mad one which would not trigger
destabilizing speculation. Indeed, by retlucing uncertainty it should make
Irish pound assets more attractive and thereby facilitate lower interest rates
without threatening the stance against inflation. Of course none of these
confidence-related benefits would be obtained if the policy remained
secret. Furthermore, if the nominal anchor were secret, it could be e,’~ily
abandoned or weakened under pressure.
Admittedly, there are some advantages of secrecy here. Thus by
adopting a target zone approach, bnt keeping the policy secret, the
authorities could gain some flexibility and effectively reduce their
exposure to choice of a target zone that was not credible or sustainable.
But on the whole, ira target zone policy is to be adopted it should probably
be annotmced.
Announcing an inflation target
If there is to be no definite target for the exchange rate, still there
should be some explicit nominal anchor, probably in the form of an
inflation target. As already mentionetl, the authorities win almost certainly
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want to supplement this with some approach to exchange rate smoothing,
with the day-to-day and month-to-month implementation of policy
representing a kind of compromise bet~veen the need to meet the innation
target and the desirability of excltange )’ate smoothing. In regard to the
latter, our discussion abont alternative approaches to choosing an average
value of the currency will remain relevant, even if not publicly annonnced.
At the time of writing, policy seems to be following some compromise
approach of this sort, but there has been nothing in the form or a
definitely announced conln]itment. It will be clear from the discussion
above tbat we would favour a greater degree of explicitness of about fttture
policy.
While the current international vogue is for an explicit inflation target
with some exchange rate smoothing, our recent experience with sterling-
related problems does seem to in]ply that relatively greater attention
should be given to explicit exchange rate targeting. Overall, the adoption
of a soft-buffer trade-weighted target zone within the EMS wide band
seems to offer dae best option, offering some i~sulation against the worst
swings in interest rates and exchange rates, without threatening a
resurgence of inflation. Previous inhibitions to adopting such a regime
have been made largely redundant by the collapse of the narrow band
EMS.
Chapter 4
CO]’¢CLUSION
h’eland shottld have a credible, stable and widely nnderstood policy in
regard to the exchange rate. "File events of tile past year have revealed
weaknesses on all or these fi’onts. Managed with some greater flexibility,
the narraw band EMS coulcl have t’emained a serviceable regime for
Ireland, But, had it not been for political considerations deriving from
Ireland’s ftdl endorsement of and participation in the constrt~ction of tbe
European Union, the narrow band EMS would never have been the regime
of choice for Ireland. The collapse of the naru’ow band EMS offers Ireland
new choices and requires new decisions. It is not a good idea to change tile
exchange rate regime fi’equently, but this change has been a forced one.
In our discussion, we have identified a ntnnber of criteria for an ideal
policy with regard to the exchange rate regime in Ireland. First, it should
provide a "nominal anchor" ensuring that inflation does not drift up again.
Second, it should make adequate provision for maintenance or wage
competitiveness (though these t~’o criteria may conflict unless domestic
wage-setting behavionr is reasonable). Third, some account must be taken
of our dependence on bilateral competitiveness vis-cl-vis the UK. Fourth, the
regime shottld be able to cope with or preclude speculative attacks on Irish
exchange rate polio, stnch ,’as caused havoc in recent months (and also limit
tile apparently higher interest rates which have persisted far years on end
apparently as an insurance against devaluation risk). Fifth, it should be
compatible with our fun participation in time construction and developn’Jent
of tile European Union.
The pros and cons of tile main options are snmmarised under these
headings in Table 2. No system clearly dominates on all criteria. The
atn’actions of floating tend to be overshadowed by fears of nlisalignment
and about tile reliability of alternative nominal anchors such as an
inflation rate target. Tile EMU provides a good nominnl a/ichor and
n’emoves the risk of speculative attacks on Ireland (as does adoption of tile
DM as our ctn’rency), but it is not immediately available (as is now the case
with the narrow-band EMS, wbether flexible or rigid). Of the inmlediately
available options, staying with tile wide-band EMS seems best, but within
that, the adoption of a supplememary target for the average value of the
currency would offer additional advantages.
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Table 2: Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes: Rating on Various Criteria
EMU (UK col)
EMU (UK in)
Adopl DM as legal Icndc~
N~rtow, rigid EMS (no realignlt~nls)
Narrow. llexlblc EMS
Wide EMS
Wid~ EMS wilh average value targel
Free noa[
Ma~ged noal
Sterling pcg
US $ ar basJ:cl peg
Provides Can avoid T~es ~/c Deals wilh Commummle.ire Avn;lable
Nominal Loss of of Speculative Option
Anchor Compcdtivene.ss $[erling Surges
+4- ++ 4-4- ?
4-4- 4-÷ +4- +4"
4-4- .° +4- .9 ?
"1-4- .. 4-
4- 4- 4- 4-4-
4- 4- 4- 4- 4-
4- 4- ÷ 4-’4- 4- 4-
4- 4" 4-
4- 4- ’4-+ "1-
4- +4- ° . 4-
-I- ° ° .° "4"
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Removal of the constraint.s of the EMS narrow band should allow ns to
avoid the surges in interest rates preceding realignments, and it should be
possible to reduce fluctuations in the Irish pound value of sterling. Bnt to
ensure that the low infladon that has been achieved is secure, and to bring
the general level of interest rates to the lowest level consistent with that, it
does appear adherence to the wide-band EMS should be supplemented b),
a credible and coherent explicit medinnl-term policy. While this could be
expressed in terms of an inflation target (following the new vogue),
Ireland’s recent experience with sterling-related problems suggests that a
better approach would be couched in terms of an indicative soft-buffer
target zone for the average value of the currency. While the currency
would be allowed to drift outside this zone, graduated policy actions would
be employed to steer it back. If the target zone brought the currency near
an tipper or lower EMS limit, pron~pt realignment would permit a smooth
evolution without speculative presstires.
Exchange rate policy is at its most successfu! if it sustains low inflation
without compl’omising competitiveness and without generating uncertainty
or volatility in financial markets, The wider margins should not be used to
engineer a big reduction in the international purcbasil~g power of Irisb
wages with the objective of improving colnpetitiveness: such an action
would dareaten future inflation and industrial peace without guaranteeing
lasting gains.
Though lnuch of what has been presented here is SUl)ported b),
systematic research, there is need for more work: on the ability of h-isb
indusu’y to cope with fluctuating competitive conditions, on u’ends in the
responsiveness of pl’iYate sector wages to changes in exchange rates, and
on the appropriate weighting of exchange rate and competitiveness
indices, for example. Some of this work is needed to document and
confirln matters which have not been systematically researched before;
some to update earlier work.
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DEVALUATION AM) THE COST OF FOREIGN DEBT
Tile purpose of this annex is to clarify a point that is often
misunderstood when the issue of devaluation arises. Thus it sometimes
argued that devaluation (of the Irish pound) would increase the level of
foreign indebtedness of the government. This statement is very misleading;
h’eland cannot unilaterally change the value of what it owes in foreign
currencies. The debt-related effects of a devaluation are more subde, and
considerably smaller, than is generally supposed.
At end-December 1992, the Government’s foreign currency debt stood
at the equivalent of IR£10.9 billion, made up of 42 per cent in Deutsche
Mark, 19 pet" cent in Swiss Francs, 18 per cent in US$ and the remainder in
a variety of other currencies. Ignoring any borrowings or repayments made
between then and the devaluation of February 1, it is u’ue that the Irish
pound value of these obligations increased by the amount of the
consequential change in the market exchange rate of the Irish pound
following the devaluation - about 9 per cent. But the number of DMs, US$
and other currencies owed did not change; the Government still owed DM
12.1 billion, SwFr 5.0 hillion and US$3.2 billion.
Pus discussed in the text, because of our small weight in international
u’ade, the devaluation of tile Irish pound could have had no effect on the
price, measured in dollars or mar’~, of goods or services internationally.
Thus the real value - the international purchasing power - of the foreign
currency debt did not change. Only b), measuring it with the shrunken
measuring rod of a devalued currency did it seem to change. Indeed, to
the extent that the devaluation helped wage competitiveness tile nation’s
ability to earn foreign exchange to service the - unchanged - debt was (if
anything) probably enhanced, at least in the short run. Thus at a first
approximation, the existence of foreign currency debt should never have
been thought of as an obstacle to devaluation.
Of course, so fat" as the domestic currency debt is concerned, a
devaluation does lower its real value: that is why foreign holders of Irish
currency debt were anxious to sell their holdings, or at least hedge them,
when devaluation began to seem likely.
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The story does not etad there, but some of the other relevant
considerations are of considerably less weight than is often implied. For
example, one might worry that devaluation might worsen tile ratio of
National Debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), for which a Maastricht
convergence target exists. But this ratio would not worsen for long, since
GDP would eventually be higher in nominal terms than without
devaluation because of tile pass-through of higher import prices - slow
though this may be in times of recession.
Another suggestion is that devaluation would cause an increase in tile
Exchequer Borrowing Requirement in order to meet additional servicing
costs on the foreign debt. If this were the case, and if it led to higher tax
rates to cover the increase, these would certainly impose a true burden on
the economy. But here again the proposition is questionable, and at best
one of secondary quantitative importance, as t~x revenue would also grow
¯ 9
as a result of higher prices. Indeed, the Minister for FinanceG- estimated
the net impact of the February devaluation on tile 1993 Exchequer
position at only £13 million - eqtfivalent to an altogether negligible 0.15
per cent of the foreign debt. Furthermore, that calculation was made
before tile full downward impact of the lower post-devaluation interest
rates on the Government’s domestic interest bill was appreciated.
That is not to say that the devaluation does not impose capital gains
and losses on different enterprises; the point is that these balance out on
average for the economy as a whole - and for the Government ,as a whole,
because the Government’s receipts are diversified widely across the
economy.
Note that this argument does not imply that a decision to use reserves
and new borrowings to purchase Irish pounds in the foreign exchange
market in a vain attempt to defend tile currency is costless. The two
questions are quite different: one addresses tile decision to devalue given a
certain level of foreign debt; the other the decision to borrow for the
purpose of buying back h-ish pounds in the face of a devaluation risk¯
°~Dfiil answer, Februaly I I, 1993.
Annex 2
WIDER MARGhVS AND AN AVI£RAGE VALUE TARGET hV PRAC77CI’2
This annex illusn’ates how wider margins might have fttnctioned in the
past if employed to stabilize tile average trade-weighted value of the h-ish
pound (tbe Central Bank’s Effective Excbange Rate Index - EER). We
note that by 1993 the index returnecl to - anti then below - the values
reached around 1981, and for tbe illustration, we have calculatecl what
sterling and DM exchange rates for tile h’isb pound would have emergecl
had the EER been fixed exactly at its 1981 level. The results are plotted
(using 15 per cent margins) in Figures 12-13.
A number of conclusions may be drawn. First, even with 15 per cent
margins,63 three realignments wonld have been needed. The exact
stabilization of the EER contrasts with the actual situation where very sharp
EER shifts were tolerated without realignment. Second, the calculated
value of the cnrrency would bare been higher during ahnost all of the
period under review, notably fi’om mid-1983 to the end of 1989, when it
woulcl have averaged more than 90p, compared with the actual value of
less than 86p. That is, of course, a reflection of the level at which tile EER
is being stabilized in the calculation, but does illustrate that a fixed EER
target is by no means a soft option. Thircl, the variance of the sterling
exchange rate is reduced (by alntost 40 per cent), as is that of the clollaJ,
but tbere is an increase in the variance of the DM rate.
What the calculations cannot convincingly indicate is whether the
wider margins, combined with reduced probability of large realignment
gains, wonld result in lower interest rates on average.
63For 6 per ccnl margins calculated realignlnent~ ;Ire ;dmosl as fiCClUC~at as actually
OCC~ I I’1"~(’[.
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VAR YfNG WEIGIfFS hV THE COMPETFITVE~VI£SS hVDEX
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no agreement on the relative weight.s to
be attached to different trading partners in a computation of
competitiveness. Various considetn, tions need to be brought to bear on the
issue. This annex touches briefly only on the main issues attd illustrates
their quantitative importance. The whole area of competitiveness measures
needs to be examined at greater length.
One ,aspect is tile degree to which ln’isb exports and import-colnpeting
goods should be considered as competing in a world market, with the
actual destination or source almost irrelevant. (For instance, UK import
prices surged by about 8 per cent in the 6 months since sterling dropped
out of the EMS. "vVhile this is not the full amount of the depreciation, it
certainly indicates the degree to which even the UK is a price-taker.) The
argument that exports of h’ish branches of muhinationals cottld be
insensitive to exchange rate movements in their first destination is a
related point. There is also the point that many CAP-supported exporLs are
at least partially insulated fi’om local currency movements - though the
insulation is not perfect. Double-weighted indexes of competitiveness such
as that used by Eurostat, and by the Department of Finance (Economic
R~nJi~u and Outlook) are a step in the right directionf’4
Another part of the problem is that the employment content of exports
differs substantially fi’om country to country. For instance, if we weight
exports of industrial prodnets by their employment content (using the
Census of Industrial Production, 1989), we find that the U K’s share jumps
fi’om 27.4 per cent to 37.8 per cent.6s An even higher UK share is attaehecl
to tourism exports (43 per cent in 1989, down fi’om 55 per cent in 1980:66
r~IC£ also Edison and Vfirdal (I 990) for an alternative approach.
65The reweighting d~:~es not affect the share of Ihe US. which stays close to 10 per cent;
the I0 point increase in the UK’s share is divided equally between the rest of the EC. whose
share falls fi’om 43 per cent to 37 per cent, and elsewhere, whose share falls from 20 per
cent to 15 pel" cent.
6a In 1989 the US shzlre here ~.’as 26 per cent. other EC ~,’zLs 94 pen" cent.
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even though totwism exports are equivalent to only about 4 per cent of
indusu’ial exports, their emplo)~aent content could be as high as 20 per
cent of the emplo)~laent content of indusu’ial exports. Then there is the
question of import-competing goods. These points are considered in more
detail in Baker (1993).
In addition to providing competitiveness data for the 50/30/20
weighting for the UK, Germany and US, respectively, we therefore also
show competitiveness with ahernative weightings: 33/33/33 and 40/40/20
(Figure 14). The importance of the US dollar weight is evident. This is
because of the sharp movement of die US dollar in 1985-86.
For refcrence, we also show the nominal effective exchange rate index
as published by dae Central Bank, and the bilateral exchange rates of the
h-ish pound against the three main currencies (Figures 15-18).
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